Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents
John F Duffyt

Edmund Kitch's prospect theory of patents has been hailed as "one of the most significant
efforts to integrate intellectual property with property rights theory," but it has also remained
highly controversial,generating criticisms that it is "without foundation" and "little influenced by
any concern for reality." Although the prospect theory correctly predicts that, by ending rivalry, a
grant of intellectualproperty rights can encourage efficient management of the property, the theory
has been unable to accountfor the fundamental role that rivalry has in the patent system. This Article explains that role. The key insight is that a patent race is not only a rivalry to claim patent
rights; but also a rivalry to have those rights expire earlier Patent races thus limit monopoly rents
and increase the consumer surplus from the innovation. The patent system parallels a method of
naturalmonopoly regulationproposed by Harold Demsetz, who suggested that competition for an
exclusive franchise could be harnessed as a means of constraining the monopolist. The so-called
"prospect"features of the patent system are importantnot so much because they eliminate rivalry
but because they channel it in ways that maximize the social benefits from the monopoly. This approach explains the structure of patent rights in terms of property, competition, and natural monopoly theory.
INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, the economic rationale for granting intellectual
property rights in innovations has been that the rights provide an incentive or reward for the sizeable investments needed to create the intellectual property disclosed in the patent document.' Because such
t Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. The author thanks Michael Abramowicz, Richard Epstein, Mark Grady, Richard Hynes, Edmund Kitch, Mark Lemley,
Doug Lichtman, Clarisa Long, John McGinnis, Alan Meese, Robert Merges, Richard Pierce, Eric
Posner, Anne Sprightley Ryan, Stewart Sterk. David Strauss, and the participants in workshops
at The University of Virginia, The University of Chicago, New York University, and William &
Mary Law School for comments and assistance on earlier drafts of this Article.
I The Senate Committee report written by Fritz Machlup remains the best summary of
the traditional theory undergirding the patent system. See Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review
of the Patent System, Study No 15, Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong, 2d Sess 1, 33 (1958) ("The thesis that the patent
system may produce effective profit incentives for inventive activity and thereby promote progress in the technical arts is widely accepted."). See also A. Samuel Oddi, Un-unified Economic
Theories of Patents- The Not-Quite-Holy Grail,71 Notre Dame L Rev 267,275-78 (1996) (identifying two reward theories, one "patent-induced" theory, which is based on an economic rationale, and one reward theory based on natural law); Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, Patent
Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va L Rev 305, 310-13 (1992) (discussing the "traditional reward
theory" and providing historical arguments for and against it): Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and
Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal2 (Chicago 1973) ("Invention, like other forms
of productive activity, is not costless. Those who undertake it. therefore, must be rewarded.").
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rewards exist, firms have an incentive to generate the valuable intellectual property that otherwise could be easily appropriated by competitors. Implicitly or explicitly, such reward theories embrace backward-looking justifications for awarding rights: The patent serves to
protect the investments in innovation made prior to patenting.
In his 1977 article The Nature and Function of the Patent System,

Edmund Kitch theorized that the patent system serves an important,
and previously unrecognized, "prospect" function.' Kitch observed
that the patent system often confers "prospect" patents-broad patents issued in the very early stages of technical development-and
that such patents have "a scope that reaches well beyond what the reward function would require."' Though not justifiable in terms of traditional reward theories, these patents are nonetheless socially beneficial because they give their owners "an incentive to make investments
to maximize the value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the
investment will produce unpatentable information appropriable by
competitors.'"4 Kitch's justification for the patent system was thus forward-looking: The function of the patent system is to encourage investment in a technological prospect after the property right has been
granted.
At first blush, the traditional theory may seem to be the more intuitive basis for structuring a patent system. Under both the traditional view and Kitch's view, patent systems exist to encourage the
production of technical knowledge that, without patent protection,
would be easy to appropriate. Why then shouldn't society wait and
grant the patent only when the relevant knowledge is fully developed?
Kitch believed that the reason to prefer earlier rather than later
patenting had been previously discovered by Yoram Barzel, who
demonstrated that innovation presents a classic common resource or
"common pool" problem: Because the right to innovate is a common
right (it is not under exclusive control of any one firm), competition
among firms will lead to inefficient races to invent that can dissipate
any social surplus associated with an invention.' Barzel had suggested
2
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L & Econ 265,
265-66, 268 (1977) (arguing that this theory was previously unrecognized because the "hornbook" rule of patent law-that "the inventor may not claim more than he has invented"-"is
very misleading").
3
Id at 267. Subsequent commentators, even those skeptical of Kitch's theory, have also
viewed the prospect theory as an attempt to justify broad patent rights. See Robert P Merges
and Richard R. Nelson, Market Structure and Technical Advance: The Role of Patent Scope Decisions, in Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece, eds, Antitrust, Innovation,and Competitiveness 185.
186 (Oxford 1992) (noting that Kitch's "concept of the patent system would argue for granting
an initial patent of broad scope to enable the pioneering inventor or firm to plan, undertake, or
orchestrate future developments").
4
Kitch. 20 J L & Econ at 276 (cited in note 2).
5
See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 Rev Econ & Stat 348, 348-49
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that these inefficient races could be prevented, and the social surplus

associated with the innovation preserved, if the government assigned
or auctioned off exclusive claims to develop technological opportuni-

ties at a very early time-before any resources were expended on developing the technology. The goal of Barzel's auctioned claim system
was to eliminate the common pool problem before the inefficient ri-

valry for patents occurred. Kitch formulated his prospect theory "in
response to Barzel[]" 7 and claimed that "[w]hat Barzel did not realize

is that a patent system can be such a claim system and, indeed, that it
is a more sensible system than an auction system would be."' For
Kitch, the prospect features of the patenting system (again, the granting of broad rights early in time) help to solve the common pool problem "by awarding exclusive and publicly recorded ownership of a
[technological] prospect shortly after its discovery."' Prospect patents
thus put their owner "in a position to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent's value," and that

coordination "increases the efficiency with which investment in innovation can be managed."'
Kitch's prospect theory has become a standard part of the lawand-economics literature on patent law," and yet it has remained

"highly controversial."' 2 Some commentators have approved of the
theory. For example, Mark Grady and Jay Alexander have found it to

be "bold" and "inspired,'"" and Mark Lemley has hailed it as "one of

the most significant efforts to integrate intellectual property with
property rights theory."" Others, however, have been quite critical.
The economist Roger Beck has argued that Kitch's claims about the

patent system were "without foundation,"'" and Robert Merges and
(1968) (modeling the common pool problem associated with innovation). The inefficiency arises
because competition will push firms to innovate when the total discounted returns from the innovation first exceed the total costs of the innovation, not when profits would be maximized. Id
at 348, 354.
6
See id at 352 n 11 (arguing that the owner of the research rights would then innovate at
the socially optimal time).
7
Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 265 (cited in note 2).
8
Id at 265-66.
9 Id at 266.
0 Id at 276.
11 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.3 at 38 (Aspen 6th
ed 2003) ("Patents are granted early-before an invention has been carried to the point of commercial feasibility-in order to head off costly duplication of expensive development work.").
12 Oddi, 71 Notre Dame L Rev at 269 (cited in note 1). See also id at 269 n 12 (listing articles critical and supportive of Kitch's prospect thesis).
13 Grady and Alexander, 78 Va L Rev at 313-16 (cited in note 1).
14 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex L
Rev 989, 1045-46 (1997).
15 Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the PatentSystem and Unproductive Competition,
5 Rsrch L & Econ 193,194 (1983) (arguing that the legal rights conferred by a patent are insuffi-
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Richard Nelson have challenged Kitch's "view that coordinated development is better than rivalrous," contending that "[i]n principle it
could be, but in practice it generally is not."' Perhaps the harshest
commentator is the industrial organization theorist Frederic Scherer,
who has derided the prospect theory as "little influenced by any concern for reality."'"
Two problems have dogged the prospect theory. First, rivalry always exists prior to the grant of a patent because the right to innovate
is then a common right not under the exclusive control of anyone. This
problem was first noted by Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith in
an article published as a reply to Kitch in the Journal of Law and
Economics," and it presents a fundamental objection to the prospect
theory. McFetridge and Smith accepted Kitch's point that the early
grant of patent rights may lead to more efficient management of the
patented technology. But, they noted, more efficient development of
the patented technology will serve only to increase the value of the
prospect right. Because the right to seek the prospect patent remains a
common right, the race to capture the patent will intensify. Thus, the
granting of broad "prospect" patents in the early stages of technical
development may not eliminate, but merely shift back in time, the
rent-dissipating races noted by Barzel." McFetridge and Smith concluded that "prospect features [in a patent system] fail to assist market
participants in their attempt to economize on the common property
resource," and thus "[tihe prospect approach is not a useful framework within which to assess the merits of the patent system."2 '
The second problem also concerns rivalry. Even after the grant of
an initial patent, competition for patents continues because the right
to innovate remains a common right within the claims of the granted
patent.Thus, the holder of a broad prospect patent covering an entire
field of technology cannot stop another inventor from searching for,
and patenting, improvements to the technology. In such cases, the
cient to allow the patentee to control future research and thus that patents cannot perform the
prospect function as envisioned by Kitch).
16 Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 Colum L Rev 839,872 (1990).
17 Frederic M. Scherer. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 446, 447
n 30 (Rand McNally 2d ed 1980).
IS Donald G. McFetridge and Douglas A. Smith, Patents; Prospects and Economic Surphts:
A Comment,23 J L & Econ 197 (1980).
19 Id at 198-201 (using the model provided by Barzel and illustrating that, although prospect patents may create additional surplus, rivals will continue to vie for that surplus and that
competition will push the date of patenting earlier until "[t]he gains from [the prospect patent]
disappear in the rush to patent"). See also Pankaj Tandon, Rivalry and the Excessive Allocation
of Resources to Research, 14 Bell J Econ 152, 152 n 1 (1983) (noting that the prospect theory
"merely shifts [the common pool problem] to a more primitive level"). See also Part HI.A.
20 McFetridge and Smith, 23 J L & Econ at 203 (cited in note 18).
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prospect patent holder and the improvement patent holder will have
overlapping exclusive rights or "blocking patents"; each will be able to
exclude the other from using the improved technology.2' As recognized
by Roger Beck, Mark Lemley, and others, this basic feature of patent
law is inconsistent with a prospect theory because it tends to undermine the ability of a prospect patent holder to solve the common pool
problem by coordinating and controlling further investment in innovation."
This Article undertakes a thorough reexamination of the prospect
theory and concludes that, although the "prospect features" of patent
law (that is, the rules permitting fairly broad patents to be issued in
the early stages of technical development) do serve a socially useful
function, this function is not one identified by Kitch. McFetridge and
Smith are correct in noting that, by increasing the efficiency of postpatent investments in developing the technology, the prospect features
of the patent system will merely shift rent-dissipating patent races
backward in time. They are also correct in arguing that the prospect
features of patent law cannot prevent rivalry from dissipating all private rents associated with a patent and cannot provide an answer to
the common pool problem identified by Barzel. However, the prospect features of the patent system-particularly the preference for the
early grant of patent rights-are important because they determine
not whether rents will be dissipated, but how they will be dissipated.
McFetridge and Smith overlooked the value of the prospect features
because they, like Barzel, relied on a model that assumes an infinite
patent term and no duplication of research effort." Once those "simplifying assumptions"' 4 are removed, the social value of prospect features becomes evident.
Races to invent can dissipate patent rents in three ways. First, resources can be expended at an overly accelerated rate: Competing
firms can expend resources on developing an invention before the socially optimal time for making those expenditures. Second, there is the
21 See, for example, Robert Patrick Merges and John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 88-89 (Lexis 3d ed 2002) (explaining the concept of "blocking patents"
and noting that such overlapping patents have long been a standard feature of U.S. patent law).
22 Beck, 5 Rsrch L & Econ at 205 (cited in note 15) ("The original inventor and improvement inventor each have the right to prevent use of the improvement by the other. This differs
sharply from the claim of the prospect theory that the first inventor has exclusive control of the
right to develop a prospect."); Lemley, 75 Tex L Rev at 1047 (cited in note 14) (noting that patent
law does not give the inventor exclusive control over improvements to the invention).
23 See McFetridge and Smith, 23 J L & Econ at 198-99 (cited in note 18) (noting that they
are following Barzel's model, which "entails the receipt indefinitely of royalties" so that
"[rloyalties and social benefit [of the invention] coincide").
24 Id at 198 (recognizing that Barzel's model makes several "simplifying assumptions" but
erroneously concluding that "none of [those assumptions] are crucial to the conclusions
reached").

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:439

possibility of wastefully duplicative efforts: Firms competing for the
patent reward are likely, in at least some circumstances, to duplicate
each other's research. The third and final mechanism for dissipating
rents arises because patent rights are partial property rights limited
not only in scope but also in duration. As rivalry pushes the time of
patenting earlier, the time of patent expiration moves earlier too. If rivalry induces inventors to push patenting to a time before commercialization of the invention can occur (and a basic assumption of the
prospect theory is that the legal system does allow patenting to occur
well before commercialization), then the earlier grant of the patent
will give the patentee less time for commercial exploitation of the invention under the protection of the patent. Thus, the race to claim
patent rights becomes a race to diminish the patentee's rents by dedicating the invention to the public sooner.
For the first two of these mechanisms, the private costs of rent
dissipation are also social costs. The private cost of overly accelerated
expenditures is that firms must commit resources to development at
an inefficiently early time, and this imposes real costs on society. So
too, the private costs of duplication-that multiple resources are spent
producing the same results-are also social costs. But for the third
method of rent dissipation, the private cost is that the patentee loses
royalties because of the earlier expiration of the patent. That is not a
social cost; it is instead just a transfer of wealth from the patentee to
consumers (who would otherwise be paying the royalties). Indeed, the
earlier elimination of the patent right almost certainly has a social
benefit because the end of the patent term also terminates any deadweight loss associated with the monopoly right. Thus, the third method
is able to dissipate private rents in a socially beneficial way, and the
prospect features of the patent system-particularly the preference
for the grant of patent rights early, before most of the resources have
been committed to developing the technology and before much wasteful duplication can occur-help to shift rent dissipation toward this
third method.
Under this view, the patent system attempts not to limit rivalry,
but to channel it. Competitors for a patent vie to increase the social
benefits of an innovation by placing it in the public domain sooner.
The patent system is thus analogous to Harold Demsetz's proposal for
regulating so-called natural monopoly industries.2" For such industries-industries in which a single firm can serve the entire market
more efficiently than multiple competing firms can-the traditional
approach has been to grant one firm an exclusive franchise over the
market (that is, to allow that firm to monopolize the market) but to
25

See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J L & Econ 55,57-58 (1968).
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subject the firm to government price regulation. In theory, such regulation curbs the monopolist's rents and increases consumer welfare.
Demsetz's insight was to see that private competition could be
harnessed to accomplish the same objective as government price regulation. Demsetz proposed that, prior to selecting the firm that would
hold the exclusive franchise, the government should hold an auction
for the franchise in which each firm would "bid" in terms of the price
and quality of service that it would offer consumers. The auction winner would be the firm promising to provide customers the best combination of price and quality.26 The bidding for the franchise has a private cost to the firms (which are bidding away their monopoly profits)
but no social cost because the bids are simply promises to transfer
rents from the franchisee to consumers. Indeed, the bidding has a social benefit because, by agreeing to reduce their monopoly price, the
firms are diminishing the deadweight loss associated with the exclusive franchise. The auction thereby channels rivalry for the exclusive
right toward diminishing the monopoly rents of the franchisee and
maximizing the consumer surplus in the industry.
A prospect patent system fosters competition in a way that is
similar to these Demsetzian auctions. Because competitors can push
patenting back to a time well before commercialization of the innovation (when the stream of rents begins), patent races can approximate
auctions for patent rights, with the winner being the competitor willing
to provide the innovation to the public for the least rents-or, equivalently, the competitor willing to dedicate the innovation to the public
domain at the earliest time. Policies that permit patenting of embryonic research results-that is, that allow patenting prior to the bulk of
the investment needed to bring the innovation to market-increase
the efficiency of the competition by ensuring that the predominant
private cost of patent racing is not the premature expenditure of resources on developing the innovation or the duplication of innovative
efforts, both of which have private and social costs. Instead, the predominant private cost of rivalry is the earlier expiration of the patent
right-which has a private but not a social cost.
This view of the patent system also provides new insight into the
second problem noted in the prospect theory. Under the prospect theory, patent rights should be sufficient in scope to permit a patentee to
coordinate further development of the asset. But the partial property
26
See id at 63 ("A franchise system that awarded the franchise to that company which
seemed to offer the best price-quality package would be one that allowed market competition
between bidding rivals to determine that package."). See also Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 98, 114-15
(1972) (proposing that local governments auction cable television franchises, with the winner being the firm "offer[ing] the most attractive price-quality package from a subscriber standpoint").

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:439

rights actually conferred by a patent do not include an exclusive right
to innovate within the patent's claims. The paradoxical result is that
the holder of a broad pioneering or "prospect" patent on an entire
field of technology will be able to coordinate further innovation
within that field only by continuing the race to patent improvements
on the technology. This paradox is, however, consistent with the overarching goal of the patent system, which is not to curb rivalry but
merely to channel it into a relentless quest for earlier patenting and
thus earlier dedication to the public.
This Article begins with an examination of Kitch's own chosen
analogy for the exposition of his theory. For "expositional clarity" and
for purposes of "policy argument," Kitch's 1977 article developed "a
detailed institutional analogy between patents and mineral claims as
they developed in the American West."27 The analogy, Kitch claimed,
"works in considerable detail."'
Yet the analogy has weaknesses that point to the two major problems with the theory. The very history of the mineral claim system
foreshadows the first problem identified in the McFetridge and Smith
critique--that prospect patents cannot stop the rent-dissipating races
identified by Barzel. Far from solving the common pool problem associated with unowned resources, the mineral claim system actually triggered rent-dissipating races to capture property-"gold rushes" - of

the very sort that Barzel thought would also infect technological advance. Kitch never acknowledged this history even though it presents
obvious difficulties for an analogy that purports to illustrate a solution
to rent-dissipating races. The second major problem with the prospect
theory-that a patentee does not own the right to make further innovations within his patent claims-was also an evident flaw in the mineral claim analogy, for unlike patents, mineral claims generally do confer a right to exclude subsequent prospectors from the claim.
The analogy's analytic weaknesses make it a better introduction
to a critique of the prospect theory than to a defense of it, and this introduction is provided in Part I. A more accurate analogy for the patent system is the Demsetzian auction system for natural monopoly
franchises. This analogy is developed in Parts II and III, with each part
relying on the new analogy to address one of the major failings of the
prospect theory. Although the prospect theory can be accurately described as an attempt "to integrate intellectual property with property
rights theory,"" this Article explains the patent system in terms of
Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 266-67 (cited in note 2) (arguing that both patents and mineral
27
claims give exclusive rights early in the process, thus fostering efficient development of the
property).
28

Idat271.

29

Lemley, 75 Tex L Rev at 1045-46 (cited in note 14) (explaining that, according to Kitch's
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competition and regulated industries theory. Part IV outlines some

policy implications of this new view of the patent system.
I.

THE FLAWED MINERAL CLAIM ANALOGY
OF THE PROSPECT THEORY

Both the patent system and the mineral claim system developed
for public lands in the American West are "rule-of-capture" systems
for allocating initial property rights. Such systems are, of course, ubiquitous: They govern not only patents and mining claims, but also salvage rights in maritime law, game and fishing rights, and even owner-

ship of home-run balls hit by famous baseball players."' It is not surprising that the patent system bears some resemblance to other ruleof-capture systems.
Kitch identified several features of the mineral claim system that

are duplicated in the patent system. For example, priority in both systems is awarded on the basis of actual discovery; a "near miss" loses in
both systems, without regard to the quality of the efforts by the almost-discoverer." Both systems require the claimant to identify his
theory, private property rights promote efficient development of land just as broad patent rights
promote efficient development of the patented technology).
-3' See Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J L & Econ
393, 412-27 (1995) (detailing property systems that rely on the rule of capture or rule of first
possession); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property,52 U Chi L Rev 73, 75 (1985)
("[Alnalogies to the capture of wild animals show up time and again when courts have to deal on
a nonstatutory basis with some 'fugitive' resource that is being reduced to property for the first
time, such as oil, gas, groundwater, or space on the spectrum of radio frequencies."). See also Phil
Rogers, McGwire: "I've Amazed Myself" Chi Trib 1 (Sept 28, 1998) (noting that the seventieth
home-run ball hit by Mark McGwire now belonged to Phil Ozersky because it "landed in [his]
hands"); Michael Grunwald, He's Having a Ball, for $3 Million: Comics Mogul Is Anonymous
Buyer of McGwire's 70th, Wash Post AI (Feb 9, 1999) (reporting that Ozersky sold the ball to
Todd McFarlane, a comic book mogul, for $3 million). The rule-of-capture system can, of course,
lead to mad scrambles for the resource and may in rare circumstances produce an effective "tie"
in capture. See, for example, Dean E. Murphy, Play Ball!: How Finders Keepers Turned into a
Joint-Custody Case, NY Times § 4 at 7 (Dec 22,2002) (reporting on a court decision holding that,
from an "out-of-control mob" that was "engaged in violent, illegal behavior" in trying to capture
the seventy-third home-run ball hit by Barry Bonds, two individuals emerged with claims "of
equal quality" to the ball). And, of course, the scramble to claim the property can easily dissipate
all of the property's value. See Bob Egelko, Fan Not Having a Ball: Fresh Legal Woes for Man
Who Caught Bonds' 73rd Homer, San Fran Chron A14 (July 9,2003) (reporting that one of the
co-owners of Bonds's seventy-third home-run ball was being sued by his lawyer for $473,530 in
legal fees arising from the ownership dispute over the ball, even though the co-owner realized
only $225,000 from the auction of the ball).
31 See Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 273 (cited in note 2). This feature of the mining law, however, changed in the early twentieth century when the Supreme Court recognized the doctrine of
pedis possessio, which confers a "foothold" to the first person who begins exploratory efforts. See
Union Oil Co of California v Smith, 249 US 337, 346-47 (1919) ("[U]pon the public domain a
miner may hold the place in which he may be working against all others having no better right,
and while he remains in possession, diligently working towards discovery, is entitled ... to be protected against forcible, fraudulent, and clandestine intrusions upon his possession."); John D.
Leshy, The Mining Law: A Study in Perpetual Motion 100-01 (Resources for the Future 1987)
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claim with specificity and to distinguish it from the public domain."
Both systems have mechanisms (albeit different ones) designed to
eliminate claims that have proven worthless." And in both systems,
claims are freely alienable."
Yet the analogy between patents and mineral claims breaks down
on at least three points. First, and most obviously, patents are limited
to a specific term of years, while mineral claims extend for as long as
the claimant continues mining. Patent term limits have an overarching
importance for the nature and function of the patent system, and their
role is not adequately explained by the prospect theory. A second difference is that mineral claims have always been quite narrow in scope,
while patents can be quite broad, particularly the "prospect" patents
that Kitch sought to explain. Third and finally, mineral claims confer
sole and exclusive rights to exploit all that lies within the bounds of
the claim, while patent claims do not. These last two flaws in the analogy deserve further elaboration, for they coincide with the two major
problems previously identified in the prospect theory.
A.

The Claim Size Problem and Gold Rushes

Kitch observed that both the mineral claim and patent systems
impose limits on the scope of a claim:
The mineral claim system restricts the area that can be claimed
through rules that specify maximum boundaries in relation to the
location of the mineralization. In the patent system, the applicant
must limit his claims to his invention.'5
Kitch did not detail this similarity further, and the statement that
the patent applicant "must limit his claims to his invention" seems remarkably brief given that, a few pages earlier, the article judged "very
misleading" the "hornbook" rule that "the inventor may not claim

(noting that, upon establishing his foothold, "the explorer was provided security only against
other explorers, and not against the United States"). In effect, the doctrine follows the rule advocated by the dissent in the famous case Pierson v Post, 3 Cai R 175, 179-81 (NY 1805)
(Livingston dissenting), that the chase is sufficient to vest priority in property rights. No similar
doctrine has ever been recognized in patent law.
32
See Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 273-74 (cited in note 2) (noting that the mineral claim system requires the claimant to stake notice on the land and to describe the boundaries of the
property while the patent system requires the inventor to define the legal scope of the invention
in a formal patent "claim").
33 See id at 274 (stating that mining law requires claimants to make certain annual expenditures in working their claims in order to retain them and patent law requires periodic maintenance fees and limits rights to a term of years).
34 See id (noting that the interests in both patent and mineral claims "can be transferred,
both before and after the rights to the claim are established").
35
Idat 273.

2004]

Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents

more than he has invented.", Kitch's brevity is all the more striking
because claim scope is crucial to the prospect theory. The first reason
Kitch gave for the importance of his theory is that it helps explain "the
scope accorded to patent claims, a scope that reaches well beyond
what the reward function would require.""

Mineral claims are, in fact, exceptionally narrow in scope. Placer
claims-claims to mineral deposits "not in place, that is, not fixed in
rock, but which are in a loose state""-are generally limited under
federal law to 20 acres each, with an exception permitting an associated group to hold up to 8 such claims or 160 acres. " Lode claimsclaims on minerals still fixed in rock-are limited to a surface area of
1500 feet by 600 feet, which is also about 20 acres of land. "' The narrow
scope of mining claims, and the balkanizing effect of these limits, are
well illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the mineral claims existing

early in the twentieth century from a quarter section (one quarter
square mile) of land near Cripple Creek, Colorado.

Id at 268.
Id at 267. Subsequent commentators, even those skeptical of Kitch's theory, have noted
the broad patent rights associated with the prospect theory. See Merges and Nelson. Market
Structure and TechnicalAdvance at 186 (cited in note 3) (noting that Kitch's "concept of the patent system would argue for granting an initial patent of broad scope to enable the pioneering inventor or firm to plan, undertake, or orchestrate future developments").
38 United States v Iron Silver Mining Co, 128 US 673,679 (1888). See Cheryl Outerbridge,
ed, 1 American Law of Mining § 32.02[3] at 32-11 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 2003) (describing the
"classic placer deposit" as a'collection of minerals that has been "moved by the forces of erosion,
and collected ... in the gravel or sand bars of a stream bed or a former stream bed").
39 See 30 USC §§ 35-36 (2000) (providing that no "location shall include more than twenty
acres for each individual claimant"). These limits date back to the Mining Act of 1872. See Leshy,
The Mining Law at 170 (cited in note 31).
40 See 30 USC § 23 (dating back to the 1872 Act as well). See also A.H. Ricketts, American
Mining Law § 785 at 442 (State of California 3d ed 1931).
36

37
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FIGURE 1
Mineral Claims Near Cripple Creek, Colorado circa 1900
(Scale: center square is one-quarter square mile)

Not only do these narrow claims bear little resemblance to the

broad patent rights that Kitch sought to explain, but their history undermines any useful analogy for patent prospect rights. 2 The size limi41
Curtis H. Lindley, 2 A Treatise on the American Law Relating to Mines and Mineral
Lands within the Public Land States and Territoriesand Governing the Acquisition and Enjoyment of Mining Rights in Lands of the Public Domain § 558 at 1233 (Bancroft-Whitney 3d ed
1914) (Lindley on Mines). The claims in the figure are overlapping in addition to being narrow.
For discussion of overlapping mineral claims, see text accompanying notes 65-66.
Professors Merges and Nelson have also noted that the mining law tries to "prevent
42
hoarding and speculation," although they focused on the requirement that a mining claim must
be actively worked to maintain the rights of the claimant. Merges and Nelson, 90 Colum L Rev
at 875 (cited in note 16). While Merges and Nelson state that a claimant is required "to work a
claim actively before property rights will vest," id, citing 30 USC § 28, that is not quite right. A
property right to "exclusive possession and enjoyment" vests upon location of a mineral claim,
and continues so long as the claimant or locator works the claim. Lindley, 2 Lindley on Mines
§ 539 at 1203 (cited in note 41). See also 30 USC § 28. A patent for the land may not issue before
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tations on mining claims "were not established with the idea that an
entire deposit would be embraced within a single claim"; rather, they
were designed "to prevent the discoverer of a mineral deposit from
gaining exclusive rights to exploit the entire deposit." 3 As Supreme

Court Justice Stephen Field, himself a former "Forty-Niner," explained in 1881: "The extent of ground which each [prospector] might
locate, that is, appropriate to himself, was limited so that all might, in
the homely and expressive language of the day, have an equal chance
in the struggle for the wealth there buried in the earth."" The size limi-

tations were so restrictive that the claims were usually not broad
enough for effective economic exploitation. Again, in Justice Field's
words, "[e]very one, at all familiar with our mineral regions, knows
that the great majority of claims . . . can be worked advantageously

only by a combination among the miners, or by a consolidation of
their claims. '4' The narrow scope of mining claims "guard[ed] the

a claim has been actively worked, see 30 USC § 29 (requiring $500 of labor expended or improvements made prior to the issuance of a patent), but a patent does not significantly expand
the property rights of a locator. See Lindley, 2 Lindley on Mines § 539 at 1202 ("Although the locator may obtain a patent, this patent adds but little to his security."); Ricketts, American Mining
Law § 914 at 487 (cited in note 40) ("A patent is not essential to the use and enjoyment of a mining claim as it confers no greater mining rights than those obtained by a valid location, and adds
but little to the security of a party in continuous possession."). As noted above, the active work
requirement of mining law is analogous to the maintenance fees required under patent law; it is
not the primary means that the mining law traditionally used to limit the scope of claims.
43 Leshy, The Mining Law at 170 (cited in note 31) (noting that these limits "were included
to promote competition, the dissemination of wealth, and production").
44 Smelting Co v Kemp, 104 US 636, 650 (1881) (holding that, although the mining statute
restricted the size of property that a single prospector could claim from the government, the
prospector's claims were freely alienable and thus a firm could accumulate large tracts by purchasing claims from many prospectors). See also Paul Kens, Justice Stephen Field: Shaping Liberty from the Gold Rush to the Gilded Age 11-43 (Kansas 1997) (detailing Field's relocation to
California in 1849 and his experience in mining districts). Public choice considerations may also
help to explain the narrow scope of mining claims. Prospectors in the middle part of the nineteenth century were in a precarious legal position. They were trespassing upon, and extracting
the wealth from, publicly owned lands, and they had no authorization from the government.
Their rights, if that is a proper expression for them, were based on
[tihe early announcement of the doctrine by the courts in the mining states that controversies between occupants of the public mineral lands were to be determined by the law of
possession, and that persons claiming and in the possession of mining claims on these lands
were, as between themselves and all other persons, except the United States, owners of the
same, having a vested right of property founded on their possession and appropriation.
Lindley, 2 Lindley on Mines § 536 at 1196 (cited in note 41). Of course, the courts in the mining
states had every economic reason to "announce[J" this doctrine, since it essentially allowed residents of the mining states to expropriate wealth from the owner of the lands, the United States
as a whole. Within the mining states, political support for miners' rights would increase to the extent that the residents believed that those rights benefited not just a few, but the many-offering
all an "equal chance in the struggle for the wealth there buried in" the public lands.
45 Smelting Co, 104 US at 654.
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mines from being monopolized" and were a product of a "common
aversion of the frontier democracy to monopoly."'
The size limitations on mining claims would not be an important
check on prospecting if a single prospector could (1) file multiple
claims, each of which was based on (2) a discovery of only slight evidence of mineralization. For purposes of this Article, I will assume
that individuals can file multiple claims, provided that the requisite
level of mineralization has been discovered within each claim. In passing, however, I must note that, while this assumption seems correct
under modern law,47 it is almost certainly wrong as a matter of history:
Decisional law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries interpreted the claim size limits in federal mining law to restrict the number of claims that a single person (including a single corporation)
could file based on a discovery in a single area.
Leshy, The Mining Law at 170 (cited in note 31).
"There is no limit on the number of claims that a person may locate, and therefore a
person is not disqualified from locating a mining claim by reason of the extent of his holdings."
Outerbridge, American Law of Mining § 31.01 at 31-2 to 31-3 (cited in note 38). See also Merges
and Nelson, 90 Colum L Rev at 875 (cited in note 16) (assuming that "there are no statutory limits on the number of [mineral] claims an individual can make").
48 Under the case law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a single entity could
aggregate multiple claims only by purchasing the claims from other claimants or "locators." As
the Supreme Court of California explained in 1890:
46

47

The policy and object of [the size limitations in federal law] are to limit the quantity of
placer mineral land which may be located by one person to 20 acres; and, although one person may obtain a patent for more than 20 acres, he can do so only by representing to the
government that he is a purchaser of the excess from one or more bonafide locators, whose
locations were made in conformity with the above statutory limitation as to quantity.
Mitchell v Cline, 84 Cal 409, 24 P 164, 165 (1890). Thus, the courts would void schemes where an
individual would, "by the use of the names of his friends, relatives, or employ~s as dummies, locate for his own benefit a greater area of mining ground than that allowed by law." Cook v
Klonos, 164 F 529, 538 (9th Cir 1908) (noting that the size restrictions of federal law were "intended to prevent the primary location and accumulation of large tracts of land by a few persons,
and to encourage the exploration of the mineral resources of the public land by actual bona fide
locators" and that these limitations could not be avoided by using "dummy locators"). See also
Nome & Sinook Co v Snyder, 187 F 385, 389 (9th Cir 1911) (voiding a placer claim located by a
partnership where one partner's interest would exceed twenty acres); Gird v California Oil Co,
60 F 531, 545 (CC SD Cal 1894) (limiting a corporation's interest to twenty acres of land where
three individuals were working in the employment of a single corporation at the time of locating
a placer claim). Later cases limited this early case law by stressing that the size limits applied
only to a single "discovery." Houck v Jose, 72 F Supp 6, 9 (SD Cal 1947), affd, 171 F2d 211 (9th
Cir 1948). Thus, under this later case law, a single entity could make multiple claims if the requisite level of discovery was achieved within each claim. This modem rule, however, cannot be reconciled with the early case law addressing the use of "dummy" locators by individuals to avoid
the federal size limitations. See Leshy, The Mining Law at 172-73 (cited in note 31) (noting that,
when the decisional law changed to permit multiple claims, "[t]he net result was rather silly: the
use of dummy locators remained fraudulent, but such fraud was unnecessary in the first place
because the Law was held to place no limit on the number of claims one could locate"); Lindley,
2 Lindley on Mines § 450 at 1062-63 (cited in note 41) (noting that individuals frequently resort
to the use of "dummies" to obtain more ground than permitted and that "this is a fraud upon the
government").
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Yet even if the law does not restrict the number of claims that a
single person can file, it has always required the prospector to discover
a valuable mineral deposit "within the limits of the claim."" Thus, a
prospector who discovers evidence of a potentially large deposit can
protect the whole find by filing multiple claims only if the required
level of mineralization has been found within each claim. Kitch as-

serted that "[t]he claimant for the mineral claim need not show that
the mineralization is of commercial significance," but rather that
"[t]he mineralization showing required was of surface mineralization
which could be found without extensive excavation." Patent law was
similar on this score, Kitch claimed, because "the patent applicant

need not show that his invention has commercial significance."'"
Kitch was accurate in his description of federal patent law, which
truly does make no inquiry into the commercial value of the invention
sought to be patented. The invention need only be "useful" - a re-

quirement that is satisfied if the invention achieves any beneficial result, without regard to whether the prior art could achieve the same
result in a less expensive way. 2 Indeed, outside of a very narrow range
of cases, the requirement of utility is usually presumed by the Patent
and Trademark Office without any bother of proof." Simply put, patent law has no aversion to awarding commercially worthless property

rights. But this is not so in mining law.
49 30 USC § 23 ("[N]o location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of the
vein or lode within the limits of the claim located."). See also 30 USC § 35 (applying the same
rules for placer claims).
50 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 271-73 (cited in note 2).
51 Id at 273.
52
35 USC § 101 (2000). See generally Donald S. Chisum, 1 Chisum on Patents: A Treatise
on the Law of Patentability, Validity, and Infringement § 4.01 at 4-2 (Matthew Bender 2003) (noting that "an invention need not be superior to existing products or processes"). Justice Story
provides the classic statement of the patent utility test:

All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the
well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.... But if the invention steers wide of
these objections, whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance very material to the interests of the patentee, but of no importance to the public.
Lowell v Lewis, 15 F Cases 1018,1019 (CC D Mass 1817).
53 See Chisum, 1 Chisum on Patents § 4.04[1] at 4-25 (cited in note 52) ("The burden of
proving operability and utility shifts to the applicant only if there is a reasonable doubt as to the
truth of the applicant's assertions."). Even in those narrow classes of cases where utility is an issue, commercial value is not considered. Thus, for example, even where a chemical composition
may have a commercial value because it is a valuable object of study and further research, a patent on the composition may not be granted until some present utility for the composition is
shown. See Brenner v Manson, 383 US 519, 532-35 (1966). Yet an economically worthless utility
such as curing laboratory mice of a man-made disease does satisfy the requirement. See In re
Brana, 51 F3d 1560, 1562-63,1566-67 (Fed Cir 1995) (holding that the patent utility requirement
is satisfied by demonstrating that a chemical compound has a beneficial effect on a standard experimental animal and that it is not necessary to show that the compound will have a desirable
effect on humans).
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Although prospectors do not have to prove with certainty that a
mineral discovery will lead to commercial success, they are required to
prove a mineral discovery with-in the words of the treatise cited by
Kitch-"a reasonable prospect of success," which requires evidence
sufficient that "a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in a
further expenditure of his labor and means."" Moreover, even the requirement of making a mineral discovery is itself a test pegged to
commercial value because, within mining law, the term "mineral" is
used in "its commercial sense" to refer only to those minerals "having
sufficient value separate from [their] situs as part of the earth to be
mined, quarried, or dug for [their] own sake.""5 Thus, the requirement
that prospectors discover a mineral deposit-not mere indications of
valuable deposits or the presence of noncommercial minerals such as
quartz-prevents prospectors from accumulating rights to large tracts
of potentially valuable land.'

The size limitations on mining claims, reinforced by the discovery
requirements, foreclose any broad "prospect" mining rights of the sort
envisioned by Kitch for patent law. This weakness in Kitch's analogy
has been acknowledged even by champions of the prospect theory
such as Mark Grady and Jay Alexander who, while praising the analogy between the patent and mineral claim systems as "inspired," note
that "[u]nlike the mineral rights system, the patent system does give
giant finders giant rights." Grady and Alexander try to rehabilitate
the mineral claim analogy by speculating that "[t]he patent laws resemble the mineral claim system that might have evolved if giant finds

were more common, or at least easier to anticipate."' But in fact, the
mineral claim system in the American West evolved even though "gi-

54
Lindley, 2 Lindley on Mines § 336 at 773 (cited in note 41) (noting that "[t]here is a material difference between a discoverer being willing to spend his time and money in exploiting
with the latter "a question for expert testimony and
the ground and being justified in doing so,"
determination by a jury"). See also United States v Coleman, 390 US 599,602 (1968) (reaffirming
the "prudent-man" test for determining the sufficiency of a mineral discovery and holding that
"profitability is an important consideration in applying" the test).
55 Ricketts, American Mining Law at 24 (cited in note 40) (distinguishing between "mineral" in "its broadest and scientific meaning" and in "its commercial sense"). See also Leshy, The
Mining Law at 132 (cited in note 31) (noting that the commissioner of the General Land Office
interpreted the term "mineral" in the federal mining laws to refer to mineral deposits "found in
quantity and quality to render the land sought to be patented more valuable on this account than
for purposes of agriculture").
56 See Coleman, 390 US at 600-02 (holding that a discovery of quartzite, a common solid
material, is not sufficient to support a claim); Lindley, 2 Lindley on Mines § 336 at 771-72 (cited
in note 41) (noting that "even indication[s]" of valuable mineralization, or the presence of
quartz, do not satisfy the discovery requirement); id § 437 at 1025 (noting that sporadic oil seepages on the surface do not constitute a valid discovery warranting a claim because there is no
"direct connection" between a commercial deposit and the surface indication).
57
Grady and Alexander, 78 Va L Rev at 316 (cited in note 1).
58
ldat 315.
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ant finds"-such as the discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill in 1848-did
occur, and even though similar finds were easy to anticipate. Indeed, it
was the very anticipation of such finds that triggered gold rushes such
as the 1849 rush in California. '"
The claim structure of federal mining law evolved to serve goals
other than curbing rivalry; narrow claims were, as noted above, to
guarantee to all "an equal chance in the struggle for the wealth there
buried in the earth."' By attempting to give all an "equal chance," the
mining law triggered precisely the type of rent-dissipating races to
capture property rights-namely gold rushes-that Barzel claimed
would also affect innovation. To the extent that the prospect theory attempts to respond to Barzel, it gains nothing from the mineral claim
analogy.
B.

Exclusive Rights and the Development of the Claim

Another problem with the analogy between the mineral claim
and patent systems is the significant difference in the rights conferred
in each system. A valid mineral claim granted the right to preclude
further prospecting within the scope of the claim. On the other hand,
under patent law, the right to prospect for further inventions within a
patent's claims remains a common right, not subject to the control of
the patent holder.
Under the federal mineral claim system, claimants received an estate that, "as between the [claimant] and everyone else save the gov-

ernment, is in the nature of a fee simple."' The mineral claim conveyed the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of the property
within the bounds of the claim, and the claimant could enforce those

rights against others, by actions of trespass and ejectment if neces-

sary.2 Because the claimant held the right to exclusive possession and
59 See Rodman W. Paul, California Gold: The Beginning of Mining in the Far West 16-19
(Harvard 1947) (quoting an 1858 article from the Sacramento Daily Union: "The whole country,
from San Francisco to Los Angeles, and from the sea shore to the base of the Sierra Nevadas, resounds with the sordid cry of 'gold, GOLD, GOLD!' while the field is left half planted, the house
half built, and everything neglected but the manufacture of shovels and pickaxes").
6 Smelting Co, 104 US at 650. See also Durant v Corbin, 94 F 382, 383 (CC ED Wash
1899):
[T]he policy of the government in disposing of the mineral lands, as well as other portions
of the public domain, is to make a general distribution among as large a number as possible
of those who wish to acquire such land for their own use, rather than to favor a few individuals, who might wish to acquire princely fortunes by securing large tracts of such land.
61 Lindley, 2 Lindley on Mines § 548 at 1216 (cited in note 41) (describing rights in a lode
claim). See also id § 619 at 1524 (noting that placer claims conferred an estate "of the same dignity" as lode claims even if there are technical differences between them).
62 See id § 551 at 1219 ("The exclusive right of possession conferred upon the locator by
the statute is as much the property of the locator as the vein or lode by him discovered and located."). See also id § 536 at 1193-95 (describing the interest of the locator as "an estate in fee,"
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enjoyment, it was generally true that "[a] proper [claim] in either of
[the lode or placer] classes ... is not subject to [an] adverse [claim] by
a claimant of the same class or any other class, because it has become
private property, and is no longer open to new appropriation."" The
one exception to exclusivity was quite limited: Prospectors were al-

lowed to obtain lode claims (claims to veins of ore) within the
boundaries of earlier placer claims (claims to loose minerals mixed
with the soil), but only if the owner of the earlier claim permitted the

later prospector to enter the boundaries of the claim.- Thus, if vigilant,
mineral claimants could always prevent further prospecting within

their claims.
In certain circumstances, the boundaries of mineral claims were
permitted to cross prior claims, and thus to create overlapping claims.
But the second claimant usually could not impair the rights of the first
claimant; the overlapping portion of the second claim created rights
only against third parties." Moreover, even though the rules governing
overlapping claims had some complexity (and some local variation),

they always assigned the mineral rights solely to one claimant or the
other. Mining rights were never conferred jointly to both of two
claimants, with each party having the right to block the other from
mining. The absence of such blocking rights in mining law is generally
consistent with the common law of real property, which loathes creating bilateral-monopoly problems."
The bundle of rights conferred by mineral claims is, however,
radically different from patent rights. Unlike mineral claims, which

confer the positive rights of possession and enjoyment, patents grant
only the negative right of exclusion." The formulation of the patent
including not only the right to bring tort actions against others, but also the right of transferability).
63
Ricketts, American Mining Law § 715 at 408 (cited in note 40). In the quoted passage
the word "claim" was substituted in place of "location," which was the term of art more frequently used in mining law to describe mining claims. See id at 21 ("The terms 'location' and
'mining claim' are synonymous.").
64 See id § 791 at 445:
No one may go upon a valid existing placer claim to prospect for and acquire title to a vein
or lode discovered and located as a result thereof within the limits of the placer claim,
unless the owner of the placer claim waives the trespass, or by his conduct is estopped to
complain of it.
65 See Outerbridge, American Law of Mining § 30.05[6] at 30-17 (cited in note 38) ("In a
conflict of overlapping areas, a senior location prevails over a junior location if the senior claim
has been perfected by a discovery."). See also id § 36.05 at 36-18 to 36-19 (explaining that a junior location could lead to a valid mineral patent if adverse proceedings were not instituted to
protect the senior location).
66 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.8 at 61 (cited in note 11) ("A major thrust of
common law ...is to solve, or at least reduce the seriousness of, bilateral-monopoly problems.").
67 A patent does not guarantee the patent holder the right to develop or even to practice
his invention, it confers only the negative right "to exclude others from making, using, offering

2004]

Rethinking the ProspectTheory of Patents

right in purely negative terms facilitates the granting of multiple overlapping or "blocking" patents, each with the power to exclude the

other. Furthermore, the "experimental use" exception to patent infringement affirmatively protects potential improvers who want to
search for further inventions within the claims of an earlier patent. "
Thus, in contrast to the mining law's protections for the first claimant,
patent law encourages continued prospecting within earlier claims.
And, in contrast to mining law's aversion to bilateral monopoly-an

aversion general throughout the common law of property-the patent
law appears to court the problem."
Because of these differences between patent and mineral claim

rights, one commentator has criticized Kitch for failing to acknowledge that the "first inventor does not have exclusive control" over all
for sale, or selling the invention." 35 USC § 154(a)(1) (2000). Some formulations of patent rights
overlook this point. See, for example, McFetridge and Smith, 23 J L & Econ at 198 (cited in note
18) ("The patent confers upon its owner an exclusive right to commercialize."). In this respect,
patent rights differ not only from real property rights (such as mineral claims), but also from
other fields of intellectual property such as copyright. See 17 USC § 106 (2000) (conferring on a
copyright owner "the exclusive rights ... to reproduce the copyrighted work .. . to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work" and to do a number of other positive acts).
68 The doctrine is usually traced back to Justice Story's dictum in Whittemore v Cutter, 29 F
Cases 1120, 1121 (CC D Mass 1813), that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed [ I a [patented] machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described
effects." As discussed by Professor Eisenberg, the policies supporting the doctrine "argue against
giving patent holders an injunctive remedy to prevent subsequent researchers from using their
inventions to make further advances in the same field." Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U Chi L Rev 1017, 1076 (1989).
The modem Federal Circuit has limited the experimental use exception as a matter of U.S. law.
See, for example, Roche Products,Inc v Bolar PharmaceuticalCo, Inc, 733 F2d 858, 863 (Fed Cir
1984) (holding the experimental use exception unavailable under U.S. law where the experiments were conducted "solely for business reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry"). However, an experimental use exception to infringement is expressly recognized in the statutory law of many other jurisdictions, including Japan,
Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, and most other European nations. See Merges and Duffy,
Patent Law and Policy at 1015 (cited in note 21) (citing sources). Canada also has a wellestablished experimental use exception, but it was judicially created and not legislatively enacted. Id. Because foreign jurisdictions generally recognize the experimental use doctrine, the recent U.S. restriction on the doctrine may have only a modest effect. Firms seeking to research
improvements in a patented technology can always locate their research overseas and still maintain the right to obtain U.S. patents on the results of that research. See John F. Duffy, Harmony
and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 685,717-19 (2002) (discussing the effect of the divergence between the U.S. law on experimental use and the laws of other nations).
69
Patent law provides for nothing equivalent to the common law right of partition, which
"eliminat[es] the inefficiencies associated with communal rights and bilateral monopoly" by dividing the jointly held property "into separate, individually owned parcels." Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law § 3.11 at 74 (cited in note 11). The problem created by the mutually exclusive
rights, referred to in the text as a bilateral-monopoly problem, has also been described as an "anticommons" problem. See Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698 (1998) (noting that the
"tragedy of the anticommons" occurs "when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others
from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use").
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that lies within the claims of his patent. That criticism probably goes
a bit too far. While Kitch did assume that a patent confers "exclusive
ownership" rights," the word "exclusive" can mean either exclusionary
(having a power to exclude) or not shared among others.' A patent
confers "exclusive" rights in the sense that it confers the right to exclude, but it does not give the sole right to exclude." Kitch nowhere
stated that a patent confers the sole right to exclude within the bounds
of the claims; he clearly knew better." Nevertheless, Kitch's article can
be faulted for failing to explain precisely how a prospect patent holder
can control and coordinate further development even though the patent does not confer sole and exclusive rights such as those enjoyed by
a mineral claimant and does not preclude further prospecting within
the patent claims.
In sum, the mineral claim system can best be viewed as a very
imperfect analogy for the patent system. Parts II and III of this Article
will examine the significance of those imperfections.
II. THE GOLD RUSH PROBLEM AND THE PATENT SYSTEM'S
SOLUTION: CHANNELING RIVALRY TO CONSTRAIN MONOPOLY
In both the patent and mineral claim systems, the initial right to
claim property is a common right and is therefore subject to competition among parties seeking the property. Such competition can dissipate all rents associated with the property right, and the American
mineral claim system did, in fact, precipitate significant rent dissipation. The problem for the prospect theory here is not that the mineral
claim analogy fails, but that it may work: Just as the mineral claim system triggered rent-dissipating "gold rushes," so too could prospect
patents.
Some defenders of the prospect theory have suggested that the
patent system's willingness to grant broad claims may avoid the rentdissipating races that infected the mineral claim system. In other
70 Beck, 5 Rsrch L & Econ at 205 (cited in note 15) (arguing that the actual law "differs
sharply from the claim of the prospect theory that the first inventor has exclusive control of the
right to develop a prospect").
71 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 276 (cited in note 2) (arguing that "exclusive ownership" allows
the patent holder "to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of the
patent's value").
72 See Phillip Babcock Gove, ed, Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary of the English Language Unabridged793 (Merriam Webster 1986) (defining "exclusive" to mean "1 a: excluding or having power to exclude ... 4 a: SINGLE, SOLE").
73
Because the federal Constitution authorizes Congress to grant inventors "the exclusive
Right" to their discoveries, US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8, it would be troubling if the patent statute authorized rights that were not "exclusive" in any sense of the word.
74
See Edmund W. Kitch, Patents; Prospects; and Economic Surplus:A Reply, 23 J L & Econ
205, 206 (1980) (noting that the claims of some patents may encompass other patentable
inventions).
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words, the difference between patents and mineral claims detailed in
Part L.A may actually be the key to avoiding the gold rush problem.
Although this view accepts the flaws in the mineral claim analogy, it is
consistent with Kitch's general theory that, if very broad claims are
granted sufficiently early in development, the grant of the property
rights will occur before rivalry to obtain the rights becomes significant.
There is, however, no evidence to support this view, and much reason
to doubt it. Part A reviews the basic rent-dissipation critique of the
prospect theory, the attempted answers by Kitch and others to this critique, and the evidence suggesting those rejoinders are inadequate.
Part B then sets forth in detail an alternative view in which the patent
system attempts to channel, not to eliminate or avoid, the inevitable
rivalry for valuable rights.
A. The Ubiquity of Rivalry
In response to Kitch's article, Donald McFetridge and Douglas
Smith showed that a prospect patent system-one that awards a patent "relatively early in the process of technology development"might allow the patent holder to delay commercialization of an invention to a time later than if the exclusive rights were not awarded until
commercialization." Eliminating an inefficient race to commercialize
would generate a surplus and increase the value of the patent. Yet, because the right to patent remains a common right, any increase in the
value of the patent would lead rival inventors to accelerate their efforts to win the patent until "[t]he gains from postponement of commercialization disappear in the rush to patent."7 Thus, McFetridge and
Smith saw the long lags between patenting and commercialization observed by Kitch as reflecting "the ubiquity of rivalry rather than the
suppression of it.""
McFetridge and Smith did not expressly mention the "gold
rushes" triggered by the mineral claim system, but their critique is entirely consistent with that historical phenomenon. Strengthening the
property rights available for capture merely increases the rivalry to
obtain the rights-the greater the riches available, the more FortyNiners who come West.
Kitch responded to McFetridge and Smith by arguing that transaction costs might be lower at the early stages of innovation "because
the number of firms with the necessary comparative advantage to exploit the inventive possibility will be small and the uncertainties attached to each possibility make it easier to agree upon a division of

76

McFetridge and Smith, 23 J L & Econ at 197 (cited in note 18).
Id at 201.
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Id.

75

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:439

activities.'7" If transaction costs were minimal, firms could reach
agreements to divide the surplus rather than dissipate it through competition. In other words, the firms would cartelize the early stages of
innovation.
Kitch's response has at least three problems. First, the response is
not supported by any empirical evidence of formal or informal
agreements between firms. Second, if firms did agree to a division of
activities in research, their agreement to limit rivalry would likely constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. " Finally, there is a third and
even more fundamental problem: If agreements to cartelize innovation did preserve rents, the parties to the agreements -the small number of firms with the "necessary comparative advantage to exploit the
inventive possibility"-would earn higher than market rates of return
on capital. Agreements among those firms could not prevent entry.
Other firms could invest to obtain the necessary technical experience
to exploit future inventive possibilities. Capital would flow into that
sector of the economy until the above-market rates of return were
eliminated-that is, until all rents associated with patent grants were
dissipated. In an economy with well-functioning capital markets,
Kitch's mechanism for curbing rivalry is not plausible.
A slightly different response to McFetridge and Smith has been
offered by Mark Grady and Jay Alexander, who return to the mineral
claim analogy. Acknowledging that mineral claims were exceptionally
narrow, they argue that the inaccuracy of the mineral analogy actually
helps the prospect theory: By giving "giant finders giant rights," the
patent system may be able to stop rent-dissipating races to invent,
provided that patenting is pushed back to a point so early that rivalry
is not a problem-that is, to a point where "a few Forty-Niners are inherently swifter than most.''..Thus, Grady and Alexander, like Kitch,
view early patenting as a solution to rivalry, although they rely on the

Kitch, 23 J L & Econ at 206 (cited in note 74).
See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property §§ 3.2.3, 5.1 at 11. 24 (Apr 6, 1995), online at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm (visited Mar 19, 2004) (defining the concept of
an "innovation market" to include all "research and development directed to particular new or
improved goods or processes" and noting that horizontal restraints among competing firms may
be per se illegal where those agreements allocate markets or reduce output).
4 Grady and Alexander, 78 Va L Rev at 316-17 (cited in note 1). The Grady and Alexander view is also endorsed by Dean Lueck, who proposes a general theory under which "heterogeneity [of competitors] reduces and possibly eliminates the dissipation of wealth" associated
with races to claim property rights. Lueck, 38 J L & Econ at 399, 418-19 (cited in note 30) (accepting the Grady and Alexander view). See also D.G. McFetridge and M. Rafiquzzaman, The
Scope and Duration of the Patent Right and the Nature of Research Rivalry. 8 Rsrch L & Econ 91,
102 (1986) (theorizing that, in some circumstances, "the best inventor would be able to patent
first and surplus in the amount of his differential skill rents would be preserved").
78
79
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heterogeneity of competitors rather than cartelization agreements as
the proper solution.
Even Grady and Alexander, however, express doubts about
whether early patenting really answers the McFetridge and Smith critique. As they note, any reduction in rent dissipation after a patent
grant might be canceled out by "the losses from accelerated pioneering investment." Those doubts are warranted. The evidence strongly
suggests that uncoordinated rivalry persists even at early stages of research and development.
Actual cases demonstrate the ubiquity of rivalry to invent. Consider for example the invention of the telephone, which Grady and
Alexander cite as a case where the patent system gave a "giant finder"
a "giant right."' The history of rivalry in seeking to invent the telephone is plain. Both the concept and (roughly) the principle of the
telephone were set forth at least as early as 1854 (twenty-one years
prior to Bell's invention) by the Frenchman Charles Bourseul, who
suggested that voice vibrations could be imparted to a "moveable
disk," then converted into electrical impulses, transported by wire, and
reproduced at the other end by another disk. Bourseul understood
well the implications of this possibility:
It need not be said that numerous applications of the highest importance will immediately arise from the transmission of speech
by electricity. Any one who is not deaf and dumb may use this
mode of transmission, which would require no apparatus except
an electric battery, two vibrating disks and a wire. In many cases,
as, for example, in large establishments, orders might be transmitted in this way ....However this may be, it is certain that in a
more or less distant future, speech will be transmitted by electricity.
As the Supreme Court noted: "It had long been believed that if the
vibrations of air caused by the voice in speaking could be reproduced
at a distance by means of electricity, the speech itself would be reproduced and understood. How to do it was the question.""'

81 Grady and Alexander, 78 Va L Rev at 317 (cited in note 1).
82 Id at 316. Bell's right was not, however, as "giant" as might be thought. Within five years,
Thomas Edison invented a telephone system that did not infringe the Bell patent. Edison's device was invented to force Bell's English interests to consolidate with Edison's. When that goal
was accomplished, the best parts of the Edison and Bell systems were combined. See Matthew
Josephson. Edison 149-55 (McGraw-Hill 1959).
83 See The Telephone Cases, 126 US 1. 30-32 (1888) (providing a translation of Bourseul's
article).
M Id at 32-33 (quoting the translated article).
85 Idat 532.
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At least five inventors-quite possibly many more'-were actively seeking to answer that question prior to Bell's success. Those inventors included the German Phillip Reis, who first produced a device
capable of conveying sounds with electricity and coined the word
"telephone" ("Telefon" in German) fourteen years before Bell's invention;" Elisha Gray, who filed a caveat for a telephone patent on the
same day that Bell filed his patent application;m" Thomas Edison, who
began investigating telephone technology in 1875 and filed a patent
caveat one month before Bell; " and Daniel Drawbaugh, who lost his
claim to priority over Bell by a single vote in the Supreme Court. . In
fact, the legal proceedings to determine priority of invention were extensive. "Numerous interferences [were] declared and considered at
the Patent Office,"'" and in the courts over three hundred witnesses
were called just on Drawbaugh's priority claim. "2 Oral argument at the
Supreme Court stretched over twelve days, and the report of the case
fills an entire volume of the United States Reports.
The case of the telephone is not unique. Evidence of pre-patent
rivalry abounds even for broad pioneering patents. Thus, in the case of
the telegraph, the Supreme Court noted that "many eminent and scientific men in Europe, as well as in this country," were racing to invent
86 The papers filed in The Telephone Cases listed inventions by more than fifteen individuals that were claimed to have anticipated at least a part of Bell's work. See id at 24 n 1.
87 See id at 66 (quoting a translation of an 1863 German article, which notes that in 1861
Reis successfully "construct[ed] an apparatus to which he gives the name Telephone, and which
enables one to reproduce tones, with the aid of electricity, at any given distance"). Reis's telephone accurately reproduced tones, but not speech. Id at 66-67.
88 See id at 77-86 (setting forth Gray's patent caveat filings). See also id at 567-71 (rejecting the charge that Bell copied some portion of Gray's filings). A patent "caveat" was a filing allowed under nineteenth-century patent practice; by filing a caveat, an inventor was entitled to
notice from the Patent Office if any other inventor filed a patent application that seemed to
cover the same invention. Once he received notice from the Patent Office, the inventor filing the
caveat had three months to file a regular patent application, and the Patent Office would then
try to determine the priority of invention between the two conflicting applications. See id at 8485 (setting forth a letter from the Patent Office to Gray notifying him that another inventor had
filed a patent application on the telephone and informing him that he had three months to file a
complete application covering his alleged invention). Priority in inventing, not in filing the caveat, determined the winner of the patent rights.
89 See Josephson, Edison at 139-40 (cited in note 82) (noting that after Edison filed the
patent caveat, "he put the matter aside, busying himself with other aspects of acoustical telegraphy and with several completely unrelated projects"); The Telephone Cases, 126 US at 551 (explaining that the Patent Office rejected Edison's claim for priority).
9) See The Telephone Cases, 126 US at 546-67 (discussing and rejecting Drawbaugh's claim
to priority). But see id at 573-77 (Bradley dissenting) (accepting Drawbaugh's claim to priority
because the testimonial evidence for his priority was "overwhelming"). While the Justices in the
Court majority ultimately rejected Drawbaugh's priority, they "[didI not doubt that Drawbaugh
may have conceived the idea" and "was experimenting upon that subject." Id at 567.
91 Id at 551 ("Gray, Edison, Dolbear, and others had either claimed for themselves, or others had claimed for them, priority of invention and discovery, and Bell had thus far been sustained as against them all.").
92
Id at 555.
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the device, and that ultimately "four different magnetic telegraphs ...

[were] invented and made public so nearly at the same time that each
has claimed a priority; and ... neither inventor can justly be accused of

having derived any aid from the discoveries of the other."'" For the incandescent electric light, at least a half-dozen researchers were seek-

ing the invention in the late 1870s." Similarly, in the case of the laser,
at least three competing groups had plausible claims to priority of invention."
One possible answer to this history of rivalry could be that the

patenting should have been pushed back even earlier in these cases.
But rivalry exists even among the very best scientists working at the
very edge of human knowledge. And while some inventions have
been created by a single person without others in close pursuit, those
cases are more plausibly explained as situations where competition
drove the inventor to gamble on highly risky and unpromising technologies. This is, for example, certainly true in the case of xerography.

Seeking a better way to copy images, Chester Carlson, the eventual inventor of the xerographic process, decided to investigate electrostatic methods of copying because he knew that "a lot of big companies were deeply involved in research using chemical or photographic processes, and [in the inventor's words] -'Who was I to compete against Eastman Kodak.' ' 97 Although today xerography is seen as
a great invention of the twentieth century, that was not true even in
1959, nearly two decades after Carlson had received his first patent.

Then, as Xerox was introducing its first plain-paper copier, the conventional wisdom was that the new machine would "find plenty of

competition" in the "crowded field" of office copying, and that
Xerox's business strategy was a "calculated risk" and a "gamble.""
93 O'Reilly v Morse, 56 US 61, 107 (1854). The four inventors were Morse, the German
Steinheil, and the British Wheatstone and Davy. Id at 107-08.
94 Besides Edison, the other inventors seeking stable incandescent lamps included Charles
F. Brush, Moses Farmer, William E. Sawyer, Albon Man, J.W. Starr. Hiram Maxim, Joseph W.
Swan. and St. George Lane-Fox. See Josephson, Edison at 179, 183, 191 (cited in note 82) (noting
that Edison "had decided to enter the field rather late").
95 See Gould v Schawlow, 363 F2d 908 (CC Pa 1966) (adjudicating a dispute between two
parties over who had invented the laser first); Jeff Hecht and Dick Teresi, Laser: Supertool of the
1980s 49 (Ticknor & Fields 1982) ("The history of the laser has all the elements of a thriller mystery [including] patents potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars, [and] a group of brilliant rivals all vying for the honor (and in some cases the wealth) of having invented the laser.").
One famous example is the nearly simultaneous formulation of evolution theories by
96
Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace. See Arnold C. Brackman, A Delicate Arrangement The
Strange Case of Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace 179 (Times 1980) (noting, for example, that one of Wallace's works "had badly shaken Darwin ... forcing [him] to get to work on his
book before he lost his cherished 'priority').
97 The Invention Nobody Wanted, Fortune 155, 155 (July 1962).
98 Out to Crack Copying Market, Bus Wk 86, 86-89 (Sept 19, 1959). See also Richard
Hammer, There Isn't Any Profit Squeeze at Xerox, Fortune 151, 151 (July 1962) (describing the
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That some such gambles pay off handsomely does nothing to demonstrate that rents are preserved, for the many less famous failures must
be considered.9 Any claim that competitive rivalry poses a diminished
threat at some stage of technological development is speculation, sup-

ported by neither intuition nor empirical proof.
In an economy with well-functioning capital markets and free entry into the search for technological advance (not to mention antitrust
laws protecting rivalry in innovation), the McFetridge and Smith critique is persuasive. Rents associated with patent grants will be dissipated by rivalry. If the prospect features of the patent system have
value, it is not in solving Barzel's common pool problem.
B.

Channeling Rivalry to Produce Earlier Termination of

Patent Rights
Even if all private rents associated with a patent grant will, on average, be dissipated by competition to obtain the patent, rents can be
dissipated in at least three very different ways: (1) accelerated expenditure of resources; (2) duplication of efforts; and (3) racing to patent
early, which leads to an earlier termination of patent rights. While all

three dissipate private rents, the mechanisms have different social
costs and benefits. The prospect features of the patent system are useful not because they eliminate competitive rent dissipation, but because they channel rent-seeking behavior into the third form of rent
dissipation-early patenting-which is socially desirable because it
dissipates private but not social rents."" All private rents will be dissi"hair-raising risk originally taken by the [Xerox] company" in pursuing Carlson's work).
99 Failed innovations include, for example, IBM's infamous and expensive attempt to develop a practical "Josephson Junction" computer in the early 1980s, AT&T's research into an optical computer in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the unsuccessful commercialization of the
"Iridium" satellite system in the 1990s. See Arthur L. Robinson, IBM Drops Superconducting
Project,222 Science 492,492 (1983) (reporting that IBM was ending "its attempt to build a highspeed, general-purpose computer whose guts would be logic and memory chips made of superconducting, Josephson junction switches" and noting that, just prior to its abandonment, the project was "a $20-million-per-year affair [involving] 115 researchers"); Steven Pearlstein and Dale
Russakoff, Rewired: Market-Driven Research Shakes the Ivory Tower, Wash Post A] (Nov 25,
1996) (discussing the demise of AT&T's all-optical computing project when, after years of research, "the list of technical challenges posed by the optical computer was growing, not shrinking"); David Barboza, For Iridium, A Quick Trip Back to Earth, NY Times CI (Aug 14, 1999)
(reporting the bankruptcy of Iridium "[jiust eight months after it started an ambitious satellite
telephone service").
I ) This view of the prospect theory differs from that held by current proponents of the theory, who argue that prospect patents help to curb rent dissipation and preserve rents. See, for example, Lueck, 38 J L & Econ at 417-18 (cited in note 30) (arguing that rules granting patent
rights are designed to "address the potential for wasteful races by granting ownership 'early,'
when claimant heterogeneity is still large," and that therefore the patent system "is not a race but
rather a process by which a low-cost developer of ideas gains ownership under a priority rule"):
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinningsof Patent Law. 23 J Legal Stud 247.264 (1994)
(contending that the prospect features of patent law "tend to reduce rent seeking by inducing
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pated, but some social surplus preserved. To see this point, let us ex-

amine two simple models that demonstrate the social benefits of a
prospect patent system.
1. A model without duplicative efforts.
Even the simple model developed by Yoram Barzel and adopted
by McFetridge and Smith can demonstrate the value of prospect patenting-provided, that is, that Barzel's assumption of an infinite patent life is replaced with a more realistic assumption of a limited patent
term. Since Barzel's model assumed that firms do not duplicate each

other's research, the effect of prospect patenting in this model is solely
to diminish the problem of wastefully accelerated expenditures and to

accentuate the effect of early patenting. (The effect of duplicative research will be considered in Part II.B.2 below.)
The Barzel model of innovation can be easily explained. It assumes that the social benefits of an invention can be measured and
that these benefits grow at a rate g, which may be considered the gen-

eral rate of economic growth.'" The intuition behind this assumption is
that, because intellectual property can be used repeatedly with no ad-

ditional social cost, the value of an invention increases as demand for
the innovation increases.'"2 Figure 2 below shows social benefits per

year flowing from a hypothetical innovation where the benefits grow
at an annual rate of 5 percent and reach a level of $10 per year in the

year 2010. ""

early elimination or redirection of R&D by rival firms on issuance"); Grady and Alexander, 78
Va L Rev at 317-19 (cited in note 1) (arguing that the patent system is designed to help preserve
rents by granting rights at a time when a few prospectors "are inherently swifter than the rest").
In contrast, the view expressed here assumes that competing firms are homogenous, and that all
rents will be dissipated. Still, the prospect patent system is desirable, because it channels rentseeking behavior into early patenting, which results in early patent expiration.
"ll See Barzel, 50 Rev Econ & Stat at 349-50 (cited in note 5) (providing that royalties are a
function of demand, which is assumed to grow at a continuous rate).
1 2 Thus, for example, consider an innovation that decreases the cost of making a car by $1.
In an economy where the yearly demand for cars is 100, the innovation has a social value of $100
per year, but if the yearly demand rises to 110 cars, then the social value of the invention rises to
$110 per year.
'") The numbers here have been chosen for simplicity.
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FIGURE 2
Social Benefits per Year from a Hypothetical Invention
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If we make three additional assumptions-(i) that this hypothetical innovation costs $100 to develop; (ii) that this cost is constant in
time (an assumption also made in the Barzel model); and (iii) that the
annual rate of return on capital investments in the economy (that is,
the cost of capital) is 10 percent-then the socially optimal time to invest the $100 to produce the innovation is 2010, when the benefit from
the innovation just equals $10 per year. This is the optimal time because investing $100 elsewhere in the economy yields (by assumption)
a rate of return of $10 per year (dark line on graph). If $100 were invested at any year prior to 2010 to create the innovation, the returns
on that investment would initially be less than $10 per year. Thus,
prior to 2010, society would be better off investing the $100 elsewhere
in the economy, reaping a $10 per year return on those investments,
and then shifting the capital to pay for the innovation in 2010.
One problem for a patent system-the problem noted by Barzel-is that society does not directly control the timing of innovations.
Instead, private firms race to capture the rewards implicit in a patent
grant. If the rewards are too great (for example, if the patent term is
too long), then the firms will "over-race," creating the innovation at an
inefficiently early time. If we assume in the simple example set forth
above that the patentee captures all of the social benefits during the
patent term and none thereafter (here again, we follow the simplifying
assumptions made by Barzel), the present discounted value of a
twenty-year patent granted in 2010 is about $126.! ' This means that, in
the absence of competitive pressures, a firm could spend $100 in 2010
to purchase an asset (the patent) worth $126; the firm would thus realize a rent of $26. (See Figure 3, the rightmost point on the chart.) But
14 This is the sum of the patentee's royalties from 2010 to 2030, with the stream of royalties

discounted by 10 percent per year.
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in a world with competition, that will not happen. Instead, firms will
race against each other to capture the innovation sooner and, by racing earlier in time, they will drive down the value of the patent (because the flow of royalties is lower in earlier periods). The race will
push patenting back to a time when all rents associated with the patent will be dissipated (that is, to the time when rents are reduced to
zero).
All that has been said so far is true whether or not the patent system is a prospect system. The choice between a prospect and nonprospect patent system will, however, govern the precise manner in
which the rent dissipation occurs. We may assume that the government's patent policy cannot affect the flow of the social benefits associated with an invention or the total costs of creating the invention.
Patent policy can, however, affect the allocation of costs between prepatent and post-patent expenditures. In a non-prospect patent system,
patents are not awarded until the invention is fully developed prior to
patenting, and thus the bulk of the expenditures necessary to develop
the innovation must be made prior to patenting. In other words, a firm
seeking to capture a patent right must expend more resources earlier
in time than it would under a prospect approach. The rents associated
with the patent are then dissipated through two mechanisms: First, the
firm seeking the patent must commit resources to develop the innovation (the full $100 in our example) prior to patenting even though society would be better off waiting to expend those resources at a later
date. This inefficiently early expenditure of resources is a private and a
social cost.!S The other mechanism of rent dissipation has a private but
no social cost. Because patenting occurs at an earlier time, the patent
will expire sooner and, accordingly, more of the benefits associated
with the invention will be captured by consumers rather than by the
patentee. (As previously mentioned, Barzel's model does not allow for
duplicative research, so there are only two mechanisms of rent dissipation.)
The shift from a non-prospect patent system to a prospect system
will decrease the share of private rents dissipated because of inefficiently early expenditures (which is socially costly) and increase the
share dissipated by earlier patenting (which is not socially costly). The
prospect patent system has this effect because it allows patenting after
To see how the patentee bears this social cost, we can assume that the patentee creates
the invention by borrowing the $100. Interest payments of $10 per year will then begin immediately even though the patentee is realizing less than $10 per year in royalties during the years
prior to 2010. The shortfall between the $10 per year cost of capital and the lower level of royalties is the social cost of early dedication of resources to developing the innovation, and the patentee bears this cost by experiencing a negative cash flow (interest payments going out minus
the royalties coming in) in the years prior to 2010.
M05
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very few resources have been devoted to developing the innovation.
Indeed, in some real-world cases, the amount spent prior to patenting
is only about 0.1 percent of the total cost of developing the innovation. " The bulk of the expenditures can then be delayed until the time
when the flow of royalties justifies the expenditure (until 2010 in our
example). Because few resources are expended in capturing the patent, the first mechanism for dissipating patent rents is less significant,
and the "cost" to firms of racing earlier to patent is reduced. Accordingly, firms will push the date of patenting earlier, with rents being diminished primarily because the patent will terminate sooner.
The difference between a prospect and non-prospect patent system can be seen graphically in Figure 3 below. This figure relies on the
same numerical example detailed above.
FIGURE 3
Rents for a Prospect versus Non-Prospect Patent Based on Year of Patenting
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Under both non-prospect and prospect patent systems, competitive racing will push the time of patenting earlier and, under both systems, the patentee's rents will be diminished because the invention is
being dedicated to the public sooner. However, to capture the patent
under the non-prospect system, the patentee must spend the full $100
116 See McFetridge and Smith, 23 J L & Econ at 199 n 8 (cited in note 18) (providing the
example of nylon, where the pre-patent expenditures were only about 0.11 percent of postpatenting expenditures in developing the technology).
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necessary to develop the invention and thus, in the years prior to 2010,
the patentee will bear a cost equal to the difference between (i) the
capital cost of the $100, or what is the same thing, the interest payments on the $100 ($10 per year); and (ii) the royalties being realized
(which are less than $10 per year in all years prior to 2010). A patentee under a prospect system does not bear this cost because most of
the investment for developing the invention need not be expended
until 2010, when the flow of royalties associated with the patent justifies the expenditure. Thus, the costs of racing earlier are larger under
the non-prospect patent system, and the rents are dissipated faster. In
the example, patent rents equal zero in early 2005 under the nonprospect system. With a prospect system, the rents equal zero in late
2003-more than a full year earlier. A prospect patent system can thus
induce patenting in 2003, which means that the innovation will be
dedicated to the public in 2023. The social gain associated with having
a prospect system is then easy to identify: The innovation enters the
public domain sooner-here, in 2023 versus in 2025.
2.

A model with duplicative efforts.

McFetridge and Smith did not consider the possibility of duplicated efforts because they relied on Barzel's model, which assumes
that "[o]nly one innovator is associated with a given innovation."""
Even in the section of his article devoted to relaxing his initial assumptions, Barzel did not consider the wasteful effects of duplication
but instead reiterated that, "[a]s considered here, the basic wasteful effect of competition lies not in duplicating the use of resources but in
using these resources prematurely, when" they would have earned a
10
higher return elsewhere in the economy.
In models that include both limited patent terms and duplicative
efforts by firms competing for patents, the social value of a prospect
patent system is even more readily apparent. For a simple illustration,
let us consider the hypothetical invention detailed in Part II.B.1. This
invention costs $100 to develop in complete form, and it produces the
flow of social benefits shown in Figure 2 above. As before, the patentee is assumed to be able to capture all social benefits as royalties
during the patent term, and none thereafter. In contrast to Part II.B.1,
however, we will assume that N identical firms are competing for the
patent and that each firm assumes that its own decision to invest in

107 Barzel, 50 Rev Econ & Stat at 349-50 (cited in note 5) (laying out a "basic model...
based on a number of highly simplified assumptions"). See also McFetridge and Smith. 23 J L &
Econ at 199 (cited in note 18) (starting analysis using a slightly modified "Barzel model").
108 Barzel. 50 Rev Econ & Stat at 352 (cited in note 5).
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seeking the patent will be precisely and completely"" duplicated by
every other firm. Thus, there will be N duplicative efforts in the prepatent stage of research and development."" The patent on the invention will be assigned to one firm based on the vagaries of patent priority rules and, consistent with the assumption that each firm is identical,
every firm will assume ex ante that it has an equal chance (1/N) of
winning the patent.'" After one firm is awarded the patent, only that
firm will make the post-patent investments necessary to complete the
invention, "' and that firm will then reap the royalties associated with
the patent.
Under these assumptions, the delay caused by fear of duplication
can be quite long in a non-prospect patent system. Consider, for example, the case where only two identical firms are competing for the
patent (N = 2). In the year 2010 (again, using the same numeric example), the present discounted value of a twenty-year patent is about
$126, and the cost of patenting in the non-prospect system is $100 (because the invention must be fully developed prior to patenting). If
there were no fear of duplication, some firm would surely have already made the $100 investment. But here, because each firm fears
duplication, each will view the expected value of the patent to be not
$126, but $126 divided by 2: $63. Both firms will view investing the
$100 necessary to have a chance at obtaining the patent as a losing
proposition-that is, they will view it as a $100 investment to gain a
50-50 chance at $126. Investing the $100 will thus produce an expected
loss of $37 ($126/2 - $100) for each firm. The fear of duplication will
11) The assumption here is that firms cannot communicate with each other to coordinate
their activities. See Tandon, 14 Bell J Econ at 153 (cited in note 19) (using a similar model also
assuming no communication between firms). Firms are also not permitted to adopt mixed (probabilistic) strategies-they must choose either to invest or not at any given time.
I It is important to note that, as used in this Article, the term "duplicative effort" refers to
the duplication of precisely the same effort. Thus, duplicative efforts would not include two firms
that are seeking the same goal (for example, inventing a laser) but are pursuing different technical possibilities (for example, gas lasers versus solid-state lasers). Also, to the extent that an experiment's results need to be confirmed through multiple tests, the assumption of duplicative efforts as it is made here means that each firm will duplicate the multiple confirming tests. In sum,
the concept of duplicative efforts is defined here so that there is no social value to the duplication. This is obviously a very narrow definition of duplication. A more realistic model of research
would recognize that firms seeking the same goal have only a limited probability of duplicating
the research success of another firm. The implications of this more realistic model are described
in Part ll.D.
II I Patent rights are, of course, assigned on the basis of rules governing priority in interference proceedings. If, however, firms do not have good information ex ante (in other words, at the
time of the decision to invest) concerning whether they will prevail in a patent interference, they
would be rational to model the allocation mechanism as a random process, with the firm's probability of getting the patent equal to IN, where N is the expected number of firms competing for
the patent.
1 2 The assumption here is that no firm will invest the resources necessary to commercialize
the invention until it learns whether it has won the patent race.
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mean that the competing firms will not invest until the value of the
twenty-year patent reaches $200, for only then will their expected gain
from the investment ($200 divided by 2) be as large as the investment
($100). As shown in Figure 4 below (the solid curve in the graph), this
point-the point at which the rents from the patent are no longer
negative-will not occur until about 2019. '
FIGURE 4
Expected Rents for Investing in a Prospect versus Non-Prospect
Patent Based on Year of Patenting (N = 2 case)
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For a prospect patent system, however, fear of duplication does
not cause significant delays in patenting because the government assigns the exclusive right (allows patenting) after only a small percentage of the investment necessary to develop the invention has been
made. Because the competition (with its attendant duplication of ef113 Sophisticated readers will notice that this does not describe what is known as a Nash
equilibrium -where if one firm knew the strategy of the others, it would not have an incentive to
change its strategy. Thus, the example in the text does not define a Nash equilibrium because if
one firm believed that its competitor would wait until 2019 to invest, that firm would have an incentive to "jump the gun" and invest before 2019. Investing before 2019 would be a good strategy because, if no other firm would then be competing for the patent, the expected profits would
be positive. But if each firm has imperfect information concerning the strategies of its competitors (as is likely), each firm will rationally fear that others may also invest, and that possibility
will deter the firm from investing at the time when the expected rents become positive if no
other firm were seeking the patent. A Nash equilibrium can be constructed if research projects
are probabilistic. This possibility is considered in Part I I.D.
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forts) occurs only in the pre-patent stage of investment, the amount of
duplicative effort is kept small and is unable to contribute much to the
dissipation of the rents associated with the patent. Racing to patent
earlier (and thus to have the patent expire earlier) will therefore continue to be the predominant mechanism by which firms compete away
the patent rents.
As an example, consider once again the case where two identical
firms are competing for the patent (N = 2). Let us also assume that the
cost of patenting in a prospect system is $1, with the remainder of the
investment necessary to develop the innovation ($99) being made in
the post-patent period when one firm has the exclusive right to the
technology. In the year 2010 (using again our familiar numeric example), the present discounted value of twenty years of patent royalties
is about $126. The value of obtaining the patent is the value of the
royalties minus the post-patent investment still needed to obtain those
royalties-it is $126 minus $99, or simply $27. Once again, each firm
fears duplication, so each will rationally believe that, if it competes for
the patent, it will have only a 50-50 chance of winning the patent. Thus,
each firm will view the expected value of the patent to be not $27, but
$27 divided by 2, or $13.50. But, unlike in the non-prospect patent system, the investment necessary to have a chance at winning the patent
is merely $1. Accordingly, firms will see investing the $1 in the patent
race as a winning proposition-they will view it as a $1 investment to
gain an expected $13.50, which produces an expected gain (rent) of
$12.50. Because rents are positive in 2010, we know that patent racing
will drive the time of invention earlier. Indeed, if the amount of investment required prior to patenting is assumed to be negligible in
comparison to the amount of post-patent investment, then the time of
innovation under a prospect patent system will be essentially unaffected by the threat of pre-patent duplicative efforts. This point is
demonstrated by the dashed line in Figure 4, which shows expected
rents from a prospect patent system crossing the x-axis in late 2003,
the same time at which rents equal zero in a prospect system where
there is assumed to be no duplicative effort (compare Figure 3).
There is a fairly simple intuition for why a prospect patent system
helps to keep the time of patenting early even where firms fear duplicative research: By allowing a patent to occur before firms commit the
bulk of the expenditures necessary to develop the invention, the prospect system reduces wasteful expenditures on duplication and thus
makes the process of investing in innovation more efficient. This intuition can be seen even more clearly with a few simple equations.
In deciding whether to invest in seeking the patent, each firm will
evaluate the expected profits (or rents) that can be realized by making
the investment. These expected profits (r) can be written as the simple
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equation set forth below, where R denotes the discounted value of all
expected royalties during the twenty-year patent term, I is the prepatent investment needed to compete for the patent, C is the postpatent expenditure needed to develop the innovation fully (to commercialize it), and N is the number of firms expected to compete for
the patent:
(1)

it = [(R - C) * (l/N)] - I

The firm's profits are thus the value of the patent (R - C) times
the probability of getting the patent (1/N), minus the cost of seeking
the patent (I). In other words, investing in obtaining the patent is like
entering a raffle where the cost of a ticket is I, the prize is (R - C), and
the total number of players, each with one ticket, is N.
Under the assumption of ubiquitous rivalry, the competition to
gain the patent will insure that all profits (rents) are dissipated (Rt = 0),
and so investment in innovation will occur at the time when the cost
of innovation just equals the expected reward from innovation:
(2)

I = (R - C)IN

This equation can be rewritten as:
(3)

R = C + NI

This last equation states simply that investment will not occur until the expected royalties from the invention (R) equal the total
amount that would be expended by all participants in the industry to
produce the invention (C + NI). This is not a surprising result since it
means that the industry will be in a competitive equilibrium: As a
whole, firms will neither gain nor lose from investing in innovation."4
The equation does reveal how shifting toward a prospect patent system moves the time of patenting earlier. Government policy is assumed to be unable to affect the total cost of innovation (C + I), but it
can affect the distribution of this cost between pre- and post-patent
expenditures-that is, between I and C. Requiring less investment
prior to the grant of a patent reallocates costs from I to C, because the
patent is granted when significant additional investment is still
114 Of course, zero profits here means zero profits in an economic sense -the firm will continue to realize market returns on its capital investments and thus will show an accounting profit
sufficient to attract capital.
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needed. Every dollar removed from I and added to C reduces the
right-hand side of equation (3) by N - 1 dollars."' Thus, shifting dollars
from I to C decreases the royalties needed to justify the investment in
innovation. Because the present value of royalties increases with time,
lower royalties correspond to patenting at an earlier time.
This simple model can be used to estimate the delay caused by a
threat of duplicative investment and the effect of early patenting on
the delay. If early patenting is not allowed-if pre-patent expenditures
are much larger than post-patent expenditures (I is much larger than
C) -then the delay between the time when a single firm would invest
in innovation if there were no threat of duplication and the time
when firms would invest where N firms are expected to invest will be
approximately:
(4)

Delay in investment = (In N)/g

where g is the growth rate of royalties."' This result suggests that the
threat of duplication can produce long delays in innovation. For example, in an economy with a growth rate of 5 percent, the delay in investment is 13.9 years where N = 2, and 32 years where N = 5. "7 Those

delays are doubled in an economy with a growth rate of 2.5 percent. In
contrast, where early patenting policies are followed-that is, I is negligible compared to C-and patent terms are finite, the delay caused
by duplicative investment approaches zero. Thus, the amount of time
shown in equation (4) provides a reasonable estimate of how much
earlier patenting-and patent expiration-will occur in a prospect system in comparison to a non-prospect system. This simple model shows
that allowing patents on innovations still needing large additional investments reduces the social costs caused by duplicative efforts. Because patent rents are not dissipated by duplicative efforts, patent racing becomes more intense and pushes the time of patenting earlier. If
the patent scope were sufficient to capture the full value of the invention and patent terms were infinite, acceleration of patenting would
not be preferable to duplication because accelerated patenting would
then dissipate rents solely through the excessively early dedication of
115 The analysis assumes that I and C are constants in time and that both expenditures are
made at roughly the same time, with expenditure I occurring just slightly before, and C immediately after, the time of patenting t,. The implicit assumption eliminates the need to have I and C
discounted to present value at tr A more mathematically rigorous treatment of the problem does
not, however, change the fundamental intuition set forth in the text.
116 A proof is available from the author.
117 Even if N equals only 1.1 (that is, there is a 10 percent chance of duplication), the threat
of duplication would delay investment by about two years where the annual royalty growth rate
is assumed to be 5 percent.
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resources needed to patent, and that form of rent dissipation is as socially wasteful as a duplication of efforts. But patents are not infinite
in term. They are partial property rights, limited in both scope and
time. Thus, as competing innovators accelerate patenting earlier in
time, they also lose a greater and greater portion of the rents associated with the innovation because the innovation will be dedicated to
the public domain sooner. Limitations on patent scope may also decrease the portion of rents captured by an early patentee. These positive externalities make acceleration of patenting a socially preferable
way to dissipate rents.
C. The Analogy to Demsetzian Auctions of Natural
Monopoly Franchises
Under the view set forth in this Article, the best analogy to the
patent system is not the mineral claim system established in the
American West, but the system proposed by Harold Demsetz for substituting competition in place of government price regulation of socalled natural monopolies. Although legal and economic thought has
typically segregated patent policy from the theory of public utility
regulation, that separation is unfortunate because innovation is in fact
just a special case of the problem of natural monopoly, a subject familiar to public utility regulation. It is, therefore, altogether appropriate
to consider regulatory approaches to the natural monopoly problem
in evaluating patent policy; indeed, this branch of regulatory theory
may provide more insight into the patent system than analogies to a
system for claiming fee-simple interests in physical property.
1. Innovation as a natural monopoly.
A "natural monopoly" is said to be present in any market where
the average cost of providing the relevant good continues to decline
throughout the range of demand. Typically, such "declining average
cost" conditions occur where production of the good has high fixed
costs and relatively low marginal cost."" For example, electrical service
has frequently been considered one example of a declining average
cost industry because an efficient electrical production and distribution system requires large capital expenditures but, once the system is
built, the marginal cost of providing additional units of electricity is
relatively small. As a result of this cost structure, concentrating all service in a single firm may be more efficient than having multiple com118See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 12.1 at 361-64 (cited in note 11)
(discussing the economics of natural monopolies). The condition of declining average costs will
always occur where the per-unit fixed cost is greater than marginal cost. It is also always present
whenever the marginal cost is constant or decreases throughout the range of production.
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peting firms in the market."' Because a single firm is in theory more
efficient than competing firms, such industries are said to be "natural"
monopolies.
Innovation is a special case of natural monopoly. The fixed costs
of producing an innovation are the costs associated with the intellectual effort, namely the costs of research and development. Once the
innovation has been created, the marginal cost of using it an additional time is very low; in fact, in most cases, it is essentially zero.1211
This feature of zero marginal cost distinguishes intellectual property from physical property. If my mousetrap factory is located on
Blackacre, that same property cannot also be used for someone else's
factory. Or, perhaps more appropriately in the context of this Article,
if Goldenacre is being mined by one party, another cannot begin mining it without imposing some costs on the first miner. The use of the
physical property is usually said to be rival (one person's use forecloses another's), while use of intellectual property is usually said to
be "nonrival." 2 The term "nonrival" is, however, merely another way
of stating that there is usually no marginal social cost associated with
using intellectual property multiple times. The difference between real
and intellectual property is a major reason why natural monopoly
theory may provide a better analogy for the patent system than the
American mining system.
2. The Demsetzian insight.
The standard approach to the problem of natural monopoly-or,
at least, the standard approach during the twentieth century-is for
the government to grant one firm a monopoly over the relevant good
and then to regulate the firm's prices and services. In theory, this approach would achieve the efficient or "natural" number of firms in the
market-one-but would also curb the rents that the monopolist
would be able to extract from the market. Demsetz's insight was to
see that, even if it is efficient to have only one firm serve the market,
119 This point follows directly from the assumption that average costs decline throughout
the range of demand. The total cost of satisfying the demand (in other words, the sum of each
firm's average cost times the quantity produced by the firm) will be minimized by having all the
production undertaken by one large firm, which will have lower costs than smaller firms.
120 This marginal cost should not be confused with the marginal cost of a product incorporating the innovation. The marginal cost of the intellectual property incorporated in, for example,
an innovative new mousetrap is not the cost of producing an additional mousetrap, but merely
the cost of supplying the information so that the new mousetrap can be produced. Thus, the
knowledge necessary to build the new mousetrap may be analogized to the electricity necessary
to run the mousetrap production line. Both the knowledge and the electricity are factors of production; both have high fixed costs and low marginal costs.
121 See, for example, Michael A. Carrier, Unravelingthe Patent-AntitrustParadox, 150 U Pa
L Rev 761,767 (2002).
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competition is still possible provided that the competition occurs before any one firm is selected as the monopolist. His proposal was that
the government should auction the exclusive franchise over the market to the bidder offering the best service in terms of price and quality.
The bidders would therefore compete against each other by bidding to
diminish their monopoly rents. The competition to gain the exclusive
right would be harnessed to reduce private rents while increasing social surplus.'
Where patent rights are limited in time, a competition to patent
earlier will resemble a Demsetzian auction in that, by trying to be first
to patent, the competing inventors are also vying to diminish their
rents by placing the patent in the public domain sooner. ' Social surplus is also increased because the output restriction imposed by the
patent ends sooner. As with Demsetzian auctions, competition for the
exclusive right should drive the sum of the rents conferred by the exclusive franchise toward the total average cost of obtaining the good.
Thus, the winning bidders or inventors will not, on average, obtain supracompetitive returns on investment.
There are three principal differences between Demsetzian auctions and patent races. First, the "auctions" created by the patent system occur only over the course of time. At any given moment, the intellectual property right is being offered at a specific set of terms:
Rents associated with the innovation will go to the patentee for a set
number of years and to the public thereafter. But this temporal structure makes little economic difference. Since bidders are free to advance the time of innovation to be arbitrarily early or to delay innovation to be arbitrarily late (with early and late innovation correlated to,
respectively, greater and lesser rents dedicated to the public), a full
range of possible bids are available over the course of time.'24 Nor is
See generally Demsetz, II J L & Econ 55 (cited in note 25). If price discrimination is not
possible and elasticity of demand is positive, deadweight loss will not be eliminated because the
bidders will offer service at their average, not marginal, costs.
123 1 assume here that the patent is awarded to the inventor seeking the earliest expiration
date. That assumption is accurate for most patent systems in the world because priority in those
systems is awarded to the first to file and the patent term is defined as a number of years following the filing date. In the United States, the assumption is a good approximation because the patent term is now defined as a number of years after filing and, even though priority is in theory
awarded to the first to invent, in practice it is difficult to obtain a priority date much before the
time of filing. The analysis set forth in this Article suggests that, if a first-to-invent priority is to
be kept, the expiration date of a patent should be closely correlated to the priority date claimed.
See Part IV.A.
124 While in theory the temporal structure of the patent auction could lead to inefficiently
early or late development of a technology, these effects are likely to be insubstantial provided
that (1) the costs of innovation are negligible compared to the costs of commercialization (that
is. pre-patent expenditures are much less than the post-patent expenditures, or I << C); and
(2) the patent term, d, exceeds [ln(rlg)]I[r - g], where r is the relevant discount rate and g is the
growth rate in the economy. The first condition ensures that technical development does not oc122
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running an auction over such a long period of time administratively
difficult or costly, for no "bids" will be filed until the time when the
discounted rents associated with the patent right begin to exceed the
development costs.
Second, the patent system does not attempt to limit the patentee's monopoly power during the term of the patent. In contrast,
Demsetz's proposal requires the government to insure that the winning bidder adheres to the price and (what might be most difficult)
the terms of service proposed in its bid. While this feature reduces the
administrative burden of the patent system, the difference comes at a
cost: The deadweight loss during the term of the patent might be
greater than under a Demsetzian system. On the other hand, after expiration of a patent, the cost of using the intellectual property falls to
its marginal cost (zero), and both the deadweight loss and the administrative costs associated with enforcing the right are eliminated. While
it is an empirical question whether, in any particular case, the allocation of fixed costs produced by Demsetzian auctions will be superior
to that produced by the patent system, there are good theoretical reasons to think that spreading the fixed costs over a limited term may be
optimal.'29
The final difference is that, in order to obtain the exclusive franchise, the patent system requires investment sufficient to produce an
innovation meeting the patentability standard. Demsetzian auctions
merely require investment sufficient to produce an auction bid. But it
is precisely here that the prospect features of the patent system are
important. If the patent system required an innovation to be completely developed prior to patenting, the system would still resemble a
Demsetzian auction process, but a very inefficient one. It would resemble an auction in which bidders were required to build their utility
plants before bidding on the exclusive franchise. The inefficiency is
obvious: Competitive bidding could not occur without the very wastecur too early; the second, that it does not happen too late. Note that a twenty-year patent term
satisfies the second condition for many reasonable values of g and r. For further elaboration and
proof, see John F. Duffy, A Minimum Optimal PatentTerm 7-12 (presented at the 2003 American
Law and Economics Association Conference), online at http://ssrn.con/abstract=354282 (visited
Mar 21,2004).
125 The problem is similar to an optimal-taxation problem. Spreading the fixed costs of the
innovation over another year may be viewed as analogous to the extension of a tax to another
set of products. Where the extension of a tax to new products generates additional administrative
costs, it can be shown that the optimal tax policy involves a tradeoff between deadweight loss
(which decreases as the tax is spread across more goods) and administrative costs (which, by assumption, increase as the tax encompasses more goods). See Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Optimal Taxation and Administrative Costs, 69 Am Econ Rev 475,475 (1979). The optimal tax is thus
spread over a finite number of goods. See id at 480. Similarly, if spreading the fixed costs of innovation over more time increases administrative costs, then the fixed costs should be spread over
a finite time period.
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ful duplication of production facilities that the Demsetzian system
(and, indeed, any form of natural monopoly regulation) tries to avoid.
Early patenting policies increase the resemblance between the
patent system and a Demsetzian auction. In each, competing firms
must make some expenditures prior to the award of the exclusive
right, but these expenditures are typically a small fraction of the overall cost of delivering the final good to market. For example, in a hypothetical auction for a utility franchise, bidders must invest resources to
formulate their bids. They must determine their costs of constructing
and maintaining plants, estimate future variable costs, project demand
for service, and develop or evaluate the contractual language specifying their obligations. But these expenditures will typically be quite
small compared to the overall cost of constructing the utility. Furthermore, these are largely expenditures for knowledge-specifically,
for knowledge needed to define and evaluate the value of the franchise. The research necessary to obtain a patent is not radically different in kind, for determining the value of the patent franchise requires,
as a prerequisite, the creation and definition of the technology that the
franchise will cover. Early patenting policies merely insure that, once
applicants have met that prerequisite, they will not have to make additional expenditures prior to award of the exclusive right. Like the
winner of the Demsetzian auction, they receive their exclusive rights
before they have made the bulk of the expenditures necessary to bring
the good to market.
Thus, the "prospect" features of the patent system have value not
because patents resemble mineral claims, but because they do not.
Mineral claimants can continue to exploit their claim until all mineral
value is depleted. Patent claimants have their rights terminate at the
end of the patent term even if, as is often the case, the intellectual
property would continue to produce positive rents. Thus, patent competitions increase the share of the rents captured by the public-an effect wholly alien to the "gold rushes" created by the mineral claim system, but familiar to the competition fostered by a Demsetzian auction. 12 The prospect features of the patent system are important not
126 Indeed, a more appropriate historical analogy to the patenting system is not the mineral
claiming system but the exclusive franchises awarded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to encourage the production of bridges. Like patents, these franchises were limited in time, and
like patents, a condition on the exclusive right was that, at the end of the franchise period, the
right holder had to dedicate the relevant property to the public domain. See, for example,
Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge, 36 US 420, 423 (1837) (quoting the 1785 charter granted
to the Charles River Bridge Company, which provided for a forty-year term and required that
"at the end of the said term, the said bridge shall revert to, and be the property of, the commonwealth"). The patent system is similar to this old mechanism of regulation, except that the patent
system harnesses competition for the franchise to place the property in the public domain
sooner.
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for suppressing or avoiding rivalry, but for accentuating and directing
it.
D.

Caveat:The Realities of Research

The analysis presented so far in this Article relies upon a fairly
simplistic model of research. Adding additional complications to the
model does not, however, change the fundamental conclusions that
(i) a patent race resembles a Demsetzian auction in that competing
firms are forced to dissipate monopoly rents by increasing consumer
surplus, and (ii) legal policies that permit patenting early in the process of research and development tend to make this process the primary mechanism for dissipating patent rents. Nevertheless, a more
complex model of research does provide some additional insights. In
particular, this Part will consider the effects of probabilistic and prolonged research projects.
1. Probabilistic research.
The models in Part II.B assume that research projects are certain-that a firm can simply expend a certain amount of money to invent. This assumption was also made in the model used by Barzel, but
it is obviously a simplification. By viewing research as probabilistic, we
can gain some additional insight into the value of early patent policies.
The effect of uncertainty in research can be considered by assuming that an investment of I purchases not certainty but only a probability p of research success. A simple model, which nonetheless yields
a useful insight, assumes that investment and probability of success
are linearly correlated-that is, that each additional $1 investment will
purchase the same increment of probability. In other words, investment in research is like entering a simple number lottery where each
player may purchase one or more numbers from a set of numbers, and
one number is selected as the "winning number." (For example, if the
winning number in the lottery is selected from the numbers between 1
and 100, each additional number purchased increases the probability
of picking the winning number by 1 percent, provided the player does
not make the mistake of duplicating numbers.) Thus, the cost of purchasing a particular probability p of success is simply p times the investment needed to obtain certainty, which we will label IT(this would
be the cost to buy all of the possible numbers in the lottery).'21

127 For example, if a number from I to 100 is to be selected as the winning lottery number
and the cost of purchasing a chance on one number is $1, then the cost of purchasing certainty is
$100. The cost of achieving any other probability of success p is simply p times $100. Thus, a 10
percent level of success costs 10 percent of $100, or $10.
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With these assumptions about the probabilities of research success, the analysis in Part II.B.2 changes, but only slightly. If we assume

that (i) the cost of developing an innovation includes a pre-patent expenditure I and a post-patent expenditure C, and (ii) all firms are
identical and make identical investments in research, it follows that
firms will compete by purchasing greater and greater probabilities of
research success until the point where all private rents associated with
the patent have been dissipated. For any given level of patent royalties

R, the equilibrium probability purchased by each firm p will be sufficient so that the firms' expected profits are zero, and this will occur
where the following equality is true:
(5)

R= C +

pN

This equation is analogous to equation (3) from the nonprobabalistic model in Part II.B.2. The only difference between the
two equations is that the number N in equation (3) is replaced with
the factor pN/(1 - (1 -p)N), which is basically a measure of the amount
of duplicative research. ' For small probabilities of research success,
this factor is just slightly above 1-which means, essentially, that there
is almost no duplication of effort. As the probability of research success approaches 100 percent, the factor approaches N-which corresponds to almost complete duplication of effort by all N firms. Indeed,
where p equals 1, the equation becomes identical to equation (3) from
the non-probabalistic model in Part II.B.2.

128 This equation is easy to derive. The profits of each firm competing for the patent equal
(i) the value of the patent (R - C), (ii) times the probability of at least one firm having a research
success (1 - (1 -p)'), (iii) times the probability that the particular firm is the winner (which is
simply 1/N because all firms are identical), (iv) minus the cost of purchasing the probability of
research success (p * I,):
_ --

(R-C)-(p*

IT)

N
Firms will purchase probabilities until total profits equal zero. Thus, the following will hold
true:
I-(-p)N
(R-C) = P*IT

N
A simple rearrangement of terms gives the equation in the text. Note that this solution is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium-it defines a level of investment where, if all firms invest to that
same level, no firm would have an incentive to change its investment if it knew the strategies of
the other firms.
129 The factor is the ratio of the expected number of research successes (pN) to the probability of at least one research success (1 - (1 - p)'). The expected number of successes is always
greater than the probability of at least one success, and so the quantity (pN/(1 - (1 - p)')) will
always be greater than 1.
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The conclusion reached in Part II.B.2-that requiring less investment prior to patenting will reduce duplication and thereby accelerate patenting to an earlier time-remains valid. Patent policies that
shift costs to the post-patent phase of research and development (that
is, that shift costs from IT to C) will decrease the right-hand side of
equation (5), because the quantity pN/(1 - (1 - p)N) is always greater

than 1.' A decrease in the right-hand side of the equation means that
lower royalties are needed to achieve any given level of probability.
Since royalties are assumed always to increase with time, a lower level
of royalties corresponds to an earlier time period. Thus, as before,
shifting costs to C leads to earlier patenting. The effect of shifting costs
to C will, however, not be great where the probability of success is
small and the number of firms is small to moderate. For example,
where 10 firms are engaged in research and the equilibrium probability of research success is 1/100, the factor pN/(1 - (1 - p)U) is approxi-

mately 1.05, so shifting the entire cost of research from I to C decreases the level of royalties needed to achieve that equilibrium probability by only about 5 percent. If royalties are growing at a rate of 5
percent per year, only one year's acceleration will be achieved.
This result is easily interpreted: If the probability of research success is small and the number of firms is not too large, duplication is
not a serious problem; thus policies that shift costs from the prepatent stage to the post-patent stage of technological development
make less of a difference. Such policies still have some value because
of the effect noted in Part II.B.1: By limiting the amount of investment
necessary to obtain a patent, early patenting policies insure that the
dominant effect of a patent race is to diminish the private rents
through earlier patenting and patent expiration, rather than through
the making of large investments at an inefficiently early time. In other
words, early patenting policies still help to increase the efficiency of
the temporal auctions created by patent races, but the effect is modest
where the equilibrium chance of research success (and thus the risk of
wasteful duplication) is small.
2. Probabilistic research and communication of research results.
Where probabilistic research strategies are assumed to be possible, the expected time of innovation cannot be determined without
knowing how fast firms learn about research successes and failures.
While such inquiries are generally outside the scope of this Article, it
is worth noting that, in the limit where each round of research takes
an infinitesimally small period of time, each firm purchases an infini-

13() See note 129.
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tesimally small probability of research success in each period, and all
firms instantaneously learn the results of the prior round of research,
then the problem of duplication essentially disappears. This limiting
case makes sense, since the limit approaches perfect knowledge. Because duplication is not a problem, the benefit of a prospect patenting
policy will once again be limited to the effect noted in Part II.B.1-the
system will decrease the social loss associated with inefficiently early
dedication of resources to developing an innovation.
Fast communication of research successes and failures can therefore minimize duplication of efforts and further the same goals sought
to be advanced by prospect patenting. This is another important limit
on the prospect theory: Where government policies already permit
relatively early patenting, changes in policy to permit faster dissemination of information (for example, by early publication of patent applications'..) may be more valuable than policies that permit patenting at
an even earlier stage of research.
III. CONTINUING RIVALRY AFTER THE PATENT GRANT'.
THE PATENTEE'S LIMITED ABILITY TO CONTROL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INNOVATION

The second major problem for the prospect theory is that, under
standard patent doctrine, rivalry for patents on a technology does not
end with the grant of the first patent on the technology. Even if the
first patent in an area is broad enough to encompass the entire technological field, the right to innovate within that field remains a common right. The holder of a broad prospect patent cannot stop another
inventor from searching for, and patenting, improvements to the patented technology. In such cases, the prospect patent holder and the
improvement patent holder are said to have "blocking patents." They
hold overlapping exclusive rights, and each is able to exclude the other
from using the improved technology.
The prospect theory provides no explanation for this fundamental limit on patent rights. Kitch's theory is that, "by awarding exclusive
and publicly recorded ownership of a [technological] prospect shortly
after its discovery,' 32 the patent system, like the mineral claim system,
puts the patent holder "in a position to coordinate the search for
technological and market enhancement of the patent[]," and that this
"increases the efficiency with which investment in innovation can be
managed.' ' . However, Kitch presented no empirical data or theoreti131 See 35 USC § 122(b) (providing that most patent applications filed on or after November 29,2000, shall be published eighteen months after filing).
132 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 266 (cited in note 2).

133

id at 276.
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cal analysis to support the view that the prospect patentee would actually have the power to manage further investment in innovation.
Rather, he merely asserted that a prospect patent holder would have
power to coordinate because "[n]o one is likely to make significant investments searching for ways to increase the commercial value of a
patent unless he has made previous arrangements with the owner of
the patent."""*
For a system conferring exclusive rights of the sort conferred by
the mineral claim system, it does seem intuitive that no one would invest to increase the value of a claim without making arrangements
with the claim's owner. No one would make such investmentsinvestments, for example, in locating unexpectedly rich portions of a
mineral vein on the claim-because the owner of the claim could appropriate all the rewards of the investment, notwithstanding the other
party's discovery. ' That intuition does not necessarily hold for patent
law because after the award of a pioneering patent in a particular
field, "[o]ther inventors may compete with [the pioneer] for the ways
of giving effect to the discovery."' '
The extent to which a patentee will actually be able to coordinate
further investment in a patented technology is considered below. The
assumptions throughout the analysis are (i) that a first prospect or
"pioneer" patent has already been granted in a particular technological field and (ii) that the pioneer patent is broad enough to encompass
further improvements in that field. Investment in the improvements
may be made either by the pioneer or by one or more improvers.
Part A will show that the pioneer does actually have the ability to
coordinate and control investments in unpatentable improvements,
which, for simplicity, will be called commercialization efforts. Part B
will detail the limits on the pioneer's ability to control investments in
patentable innovations. These limits pose a basic conundrum for the
prospect theory: If patents are conferred to eliminate a common pool
problem, why does the patent system allow other inventors to continue the uncoordinated rivalry for patentable improvements within
the bounds of existing patent claims?
134

Id.

A mineral claim holder could recover the full value of the minerals taken from his property, although a set-off was allowed if the trespasser made a good-faith mistake as to the true
ownership. See, for example, Ricketts, American Mining Law § 390 at 231-33 (cited in note 40)
(outlining the principle and citing cases); Wooden-Ware Co v United States, 106 US 432, 433-34
(1882) (allowing a set-off for removal of property when the trespass was not wrongful or intentional); Maye v Tappan, 23 Cal 306 (1863) (allowing a set-off for defendants who trespassed unintentionally); Original Sixteen to One Mine, Inc v Twenty-One Mining Co, 254 F 630,631-32 (ND
Cal 1918) (same), affd, 255 F 658 (9th Cir 1919).
The Telephone Cases. 126 US 1, 533 (1888) (discussing Alexander Graham Bell's pio13
neering patent for the telephone).
135
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The view advanced here provides an answer: The prospect patent
system does not seek to cut off rivalry but only to direct it toward
early patenting, which leads to earlier termination of patent rights.
From the standpoint of a prospect patent holder, the major benefit of
an improvement patent is that, since it comes with its own twenty-year
lifetime, the new patent extends the effective lifetime of exclusive
rights to some portion of the technology covered by the prospect patent. But precisely because the improvement patent extends a portion
of the prospect patent holder's monopoly, society has the same interest in pushing the inventor to patent early. Thus, the law fosters another race to capture the rents encompassed by the improvement patent, and this race is also a Demsetzian auction designed to maximize
the social benefits from the innovation.
A. The Patentee's Power to Control Commercialization
To evaluate a patentee's power to coordinate investment in unpatentable improvements or commercialization, we must consider two
possibilities: Either the investment can be freely appropriated by the
patentee or it cannot. Obviously, in the first situation, no improver
would make the investment without a contractual arrangement with
the patentee because the patentee could expropriate the value of the
investment. For example, consider investments to educate the public
about the desirability and capabilities of a new invention. These investments can be considered improvements to a patent because they
increase the market value of the innovation. Yet the patentee could
reap the benefit of these investments without incurring any obligation
to compensate the improver. Thus, no improver would make such investments without first reaching an agreement (including the terms of
compensation) with the patentee. For such investments, the patentee
has even greater power than mineral claim holders, who may expropriate the full value of improvements only where the improvements
are made by trespassers who have not made an honest mistake about
ownership."17

The more interesting situation is the second possibility: where the
improver has control over the fruits of the investment (by, for example, trade secret law) but cannot prevent the patentee or another improver from thereafter duplicating the investment. Examples might
include investments necessary to design a plant for production of the
invention or to develop unpatentable "know-how" needed to begin
commercial exploitation. Here, too, no improver will invest without
first contracting with the patentee. The reason is not, however, that the
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improver will get nothing without the patentee's prior agreement. The
investment may still have a value for which the patentee would be
willing to pay, and the improver and patentee could reach an agreement even though the investment has already been made. But without
a prior agreement, the improver will have a terrible bargaining position. The improver will have to accept less than the cost of the improvement, or else the pioneer will be indifferent between contracting
with that improver or with another. In addition, the improver who invests before contracting bears the risks that the pioneer has already
undertaken commercialization or contracted with another improver to
do so. In other words, the unsolicited improver bears the entire risk of
duplicative investment.
Even if one improver has a cost advantage over other improvers,
it will still have good incentives to contract with the patentee before
investing. For example, consider a prospect patent that several firms
could successfully commercialize for a cost C. If one improver can
commercialize the technology for an investment of C - A (where A
represents the size of its advantage over all other firms), that improver
can always give the patentee an incentive to contract with it. But the
improver's bargaining position will be strongest before it has invested,
because bargaining with the patentee will take place in a range from C
to C - A. If, however, the improver invests before contracting with the
pioneer, bargaining will take place in a range from C down to the alternative value for the improver's investments (which could be as low
as zero if those investments can be used only in connection with the
pioneer's patented technology). By making arrangements before investing, the improver ensures a return of at least C - A and, again, also
reduces the risk that the pioneer may have already contracted with
another.
Improvers will therefore always have an incentive to contract
with the pioneer prior to investing in commercialization. For such investments, the prospect theory applies without qualification: The pioneer can coordinate, and control the timing of, all investment in nonpatentable improvements on the patented technology, and that coordination increases the efficiency with which the investment can be
made. " The success of the prospect theory here is to be expected. The
138 The use of patent rights to encourage post-patent commercialization rather than to provide an incentive for pre-patent research is one of the theories underlying the Bayh-Dole Act,
Pub L No 96-517,94 Stat 3015 (1980), codified as amended at 35 USC §§ 200-11,301-07 (2000).
See Rebecca S.Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va L Rev 1663, 1669-70, 1720-22 (1996) (discussing Bayh-Dole's incentives for post-patent commercialization). The statute authorizes universities and certain other entities to own the patents produced by government-sponsored research. At least some data support the view that the statute has been "an unqualified success in
stimulating the commercial development of discoveries emerging from government-sponsored
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patent holder's rights are similar to more complete property rights,
and so the theoretical justifications for property rights-including the
encouragement of investments in improvements-are applicable.
B.

The Limits on the Patentee's Power to Control
Further Innovation

To understand the limitations on a pioneer's power to control further investment in patentable improvements, we should first consider
how the pioneer would behave if the law were to give the pioneer the
exclusive right to patent improvements within the claims of the pioneering patent. Assume that a firm obtains a patent on an entire field

of technology; for example, assume that the firm sought and obtained
a patent on all laser technology in 1960. For simplicity, assume that the
patent term runs for twenty years so that the patent will expire in
1980. Even if no other firm has the legal right to seek patentable improvements, the patentee will have an incentive to invest in such improvements. Patentable improvements-for example, a new and more
powerful laser-will increase the market value of the initial property
and, if the improvement is patented after 1960, will also provide exclu-

sive rights after 1980 when the pioneer patent is no longer in force.
The pioneer will, however, have an incentive to delay patenting as
long as possible because the delay will push the expiration date of the

improvement patent later and will thus enable the firm to collect royalties for a longer period. Indeed, because the pioneer patent provides
exclusive rights to all lasers, the firm would not need an improvement

patent to exclude competition until after 1980, when the pioneering
patent expired. Under U.S. law (assuming all other features of the law

are unchanged), the firm could delay seeking the patent until one year
after the improved laser was put on the market."" Thus, the firm could
invent the improved laser, develop it fully, ready it for market, and
even place it on the market while still waiting to file for a patent. The

firm would not have to worry about some other firm inventing the
research in universities." Id at 1708. In some notable instances, however, a university has followed a course of non-exclusive licensing, which suggests that exclusive ownership was not
needed for commercial exploitation. Id at 1710. One possible explanation for this observed effect
is that the relevant patents need more than just commercialization, and the patentee has less
control over investments in innovation. See Part III.A.2. See also Richard Jensen and Marie
Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Tale of University Licensing 1 (NBER Working Paper 6698, 1998), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6698 (visited Mar 21, 2004) (finding that
most university inventions are at an "early state of development" and "are little more than a
'proof of a concept'); Eisenberg, 82 Va L Rev at 1726 (noting that, under Bayh-Dole, institutions
have pursued patents in "early-stage research discoveries that in an earlier era they would have
allowed to enter the public domain").
139 Once the improved laser has been on the market for more than one year, the right to
seek a patent on it would be lost pursuant to the statutory bar in 35 USC § 102(b).
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improvement first because there would be no economic incentive for
another firm to invest in the necessary research.
The actual patent system does not, however, give a pioneer patent
holder this luxury of delaying the patenting of improvements. Because

the right to patent improvements on a technology is a common right, a
pioneer will feel at least some competitive pressure to patent improvements quickly. Moreover, this competitive pressure will be in-

creased by one feature that Kitch identified as a key part of a prospect
patent system-the patent system's willingness to grant patents at a
relatively early stage of research. This effect presents a major problem
for the prospect theory, for it means that once a pioneer patent has
been issued, early patenting has an effect precisely the opposite of
that theorized by Kitch: Rather than putting the pioneer in "a position
to coordinate the search for technological and market enhancement of
the patent[],.' ' .. early patenting of improvements tends to oust the pioneer from that position and to continue the uncoordinated rivalry to
develop the patented technology.
This is not to say that the pioneering patent holder will have no

ability to control investments in patentable improvements. An improver considering investment in a field already dominated by a broad

patent might have some uncertainty about whether the investment
will yield patentable or unpatentable improvements. That uncertainty
may discourage the improver from making the investment without
first reaching a contractual agreement with the pioneer or without
first purchasing the patent from the pioneer. In either case, the existence of the pioneering patent helps to coordinate further investments
in improvements. "'
1) Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 276 (cited in note 2).
141 Some prior commentators have overlooked the possibility that sales of pioneering patents also help to coordinate improvement efforts. Thus, for example, Roger Beck has erroneously
claimed that the history of the patents on cellophane "contradicts the prospect theory." Beck, 5
Rsrch L & Econ at 204 (cited in note 15). Beck argues that the original patents on cellophane
"did not protect subsequent development of the invention because new patents were granted
when waterproof cellophane [an improved cellophane] was developed." Id. But this argument
overlooks the actual history of the technology. Cellophane was invented in 1908 by the Swiss
chemist Jacques Brandenberger, who obtained American and European patents on the invention
and assigned them to a French firm named La Cellophane. See John Jewkes, David Sawers, and
Richard Stillerman, The Sources of Invention 272-74 (St. Martin's 1959). See also United States v
E.L do Pont de Nernours & Co. 118 F Supp 41, 56-60 (D Del 1953) (discussing the early history
of cellophane): Do Pont Cellophane Co,Inc v Waxed Paper Products Co,6 F Supp 859, 884 (ED
NY 1934) (discussing Brandenberger's patents and the genesis of the "Cellophane" trademark),
modified, 85 F2d 75 (2d Cir 1936). Beck notes that in 1926, while Brandenberger's pioneering
patents were still in force, another firm -the American DuPont corporation -invented moistureproof cellophane, which was a huge commercial success. See Beck, 5 Rsrch L & Econ at 204
(cited in note 15). See also JustAbout AllAbout Cellophane, Fortune 74,102 (Feb 1932) (noting
that, by 1932. waterproof cellophane was outselling the earlier, less expensive version of cellophane by a two-to-one margin). But in 1923, prior to investing in the development of cellophane,
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Even where the improver is certain that an investment will produce a patentable improvement, the improver should rightly worry

about the transaction costs of reaching a licensing arrangement with
the pioneer after the improvement has been made. The pioneering
patent and the improvement patent will be an instance of blocking
patents; neither patent holder will be able to use the improvement

without a license from the other. The situation is thus the classic bilateral monopoly and, because the potential bargaining range is so large
(each party to the negotiation can be assured only of gaining something larger than zero and less than the full value of the property), the

costs of reaching agreements in such situations are known to be steep.
One consequence of these potentially large transaction costs is
that the pioneering firm will have a somewhat greater incentive to
make a patentable improvement than will all other firms. For an improver other than the pioneer, the reward of inventing the improve-

ment is whatever share of the royalties the improver can obtain
through negotiations with the pioneer. But for the pioneer, the reward
for inventing the improvement will be that share (which the pioneer
saves by inventing itself), plus the transaction costs that are avoided
because the pioneer does not have to negotiate a division of royalties
with another firm. Another consequence of the steep transaction costs
associated with blocking patents is that, even if the pioneer lacks the
capacity to create the improvement itself, potential improvers have an

incentive to try to reach agreements with the pioneer prior to investing in patentable improvement if-and this is an important qualifica-

tion-the transaction costs of reaching an agreement are lower prior
to investment in the improvement than they are after. "2
DuPont purchased the exclusive North American rights to cellophane in exchange for a 48 percent stock interest in the DuPont cellophane subsidiary. See EL. du Pont de Nemours, 118 F Supp
at 58; Just About All About Cellophane,Fortune at 74. Thus, the pioneering patents on cellophane
did serve as a coordinating point for further development because DuPont obtained the rights to
those patents before it commenced efforts to find innovative improvements. DuPont had an incentive to purchase the patents prior to investing in improvements in part because the early purchase of the rights guaranteed that DuPont would not face the high transaction costs associated
with blocking patents. Also, DuPont could not be certain that further research into improving
cellophane technology would produce patentable improvements and, to the extent its research
produced merely trade secrets, it might face even greater difficulty trying to sell its research results to La Cellophane once the research was complete. See United States v EL. du Pont de Nemoors & Co, 351 US 377, 382 & n 4 (1956) (noting that some of DuPont's research into improving cellophane did, in fact, generate trade secrets).
142 Transaction costs of prior agreements may be lower because the bargaining range is
likely to be narrower. Even if the pioneer lacks the technical capability to improve the basic
technology, the broader market may contain several firms with the potential to improve the
technology. If no firm has invested in the improvement and therefore none has a blocking patent,
the pioneer can force the potential improvers to compete against each other to sign an agreement concerning future improvements or to purchase rights to the pioneering patent. The competition between the potential improvers decreases their bargaining power and should make it
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In sum, even though the pioneer has only a right to exclude others from practicing improvements, not an exclusive (that is, sole) right
to make patentable improvements, still the pioneer should have some
control over the development of patentable improvements. This control arises from (1) the transaction costs associated with dividing royalties between the pioneer and an improver, and (2) uncertainty over
whether the investment will produce patentable or unpatentable developments. Importantly, however, the pioneer is not insulated from
competition in innovation. At most, the firm holding the pioneer patent has slightly greater incentives to innovate-it might be thought of
as a slight "head start." But that head start is limited and, as time goes
on, the pioneer's already bounded control over the field shrinks as the
expiration date of the pioneer patent nears (because the improvement
patent will be subject to the blocking rights of the pioneer patent for a
smaller fraction of the improvement patent's term). Thus, a lollygagging pioneer could suffer the fate of the Wright brothers, who were
forced into a cross-licensing arrangement splitting patent profits after
their pioneering work was outstripped by the improvements of Glenn
Curtiss.4' The pioneer remains under the competitive "threat" described by Schumpeter:
It is hardly necessary to point out that competition of the kind we
now have in mind acts not only when in being but also when it is
merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks. The
businessman feels himself to be in a competitive situation even if
he is alone in his field .... '"
The competitive threat envisioned by Schumpeter shares a basic
insight with Demsetz's franchise auction proposal: Competition to obtain, and to maintain, a monopoly position can be harnessed to constrain the monopolist and to increase social welfare. It is this insight
that lies at the heart of the patent system, and it explains why the pat-

easier to reach an agreement with the pioneer. While the improver who obtains such an agreement cannot legally foreclose the other improvers from trying to create the improvement, the
other improvers will recognize that, if they do create the improvement, another round of negotiations will be necessary and the costs of those negotiations will diminish the share of the royalties that they can hope to obtain. Thus, they will realize that their incentives to create the improvement are inferior to those of the improver who was able to reach a prior agreement with
the pioneer and, presumably, this will deter them from racing against that improver.
143 See George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights Progress; and the Aircraft Patent Agreement,
31 J L & Econ 227, 230-32 (1988) (detailing the situation of "blocking patents" that arose because Glenn Curtiss was awarded improvement patents that fell within the broad pioneering
patents awarded to the Wright brothers).
144 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 85 (Harper & Row 2d ed
1947). Compare Merges and Nelson, 90 Colum L Rev at 844 (cited in note 16) (arguing that "the
efficiency gains from the pioneer's ability to coordinate are likely to be outweighed by the loss of
competition for improvements").
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ent system continues the competition for new patents even within the
claims of earlier patents.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

This Article suggests that the patent system attempts neither to
solve the common pool problem nor to limit rivalrous dissipation of
rents associated with a patent grant, but to channel rivalry into activities with large externalities. Like a Demsetzian auction, the patent system thereby ensures that competition diminishes private rents faster
than social rents. This view of the patent system has important policy
implications, many of which diverge from those of the prospect theory.
A. The Correlation between Patent Priority and Patent Expiration
Patent races will serve the same purposes as Demsetzian auctions-channeling competition toward decreasing private rents while
preserving social surplus-if the law recognizes as the winner in the
patent race the inventor who seeks a patent that will have the earliest
expiration date. In other words, a central goal of the patent law should
be to maintain a strict correlation between patent priority and patent
expiration. In the United States, the historical trend has been toward a
tighter correlation between patent priority and patent expiration; in
other countries, a strict correlation between priority and expiration already exists.
For most of the twentieth century, the term of U.S. patents was
seventeen years from the date on which the patent issued."' Patent
priority, on the other hand, was (and still is) determined by the filing
date or, under certain circumstances, by an even earlier date of invention.'" Thus, patent priority and patent expiration were not necessarily
correlated. Patent applicants had an incentive to file early to gain priority in the patent race, but then to delay issuance of their patents as
long as possible to capture the larger rents associated with later periods of time. Some of these so-called "submarine" patents would surface decades after they were filed.'
In such circumstances, the patent system failed to function as an
efficient Demsetzian auction because the winner of the patent race
was not necessarily the party willing to provide the patent to the pubSee Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 59 (cited in note 21).
See id at 442 (summarizing the rules of patent priority and concluding that an inventor's
date of invention-which governs priority under the U.S. system's first-to-invent rule"can never be later than the application filing date or earlier than the date of [inventive]
conception").
147 See, for example, Symbol Technologies, Inc v Lemelson Medical,277 F3d 1361 (Fed Cir
2002) (adjudicating the validity of a patent issued forty years after its filing date).
145
146
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lic for the least rents. Patent applicants had an incentive to delay the
patent office bureaucracy. While such a strategy realized private re-

turns, it did so only by increasing the rents that would be paid
by consumers. It was rent-seeking activity that generated negative
externalities.'"
In adopting the TRIPS treaty in 1994, the United States changed
this feature of domestic patent law. Patents filed on or after June 8,
1995, will expire twenty years after the date of the patent application. ' Because the United States follows a first-to-invent rule for establishing patent priority (granting priority for the earliest date of invention, not the earliest filing date), this change does not perfectly
correlate patent priority and patent expiration. But in practice the
correlation is usually fairly good, because American patent law treats

the filing date as the presumptive date of invention and numerous
doctrines restrict the ability of an inventor to establish any earlier pri5
ority date.'

Though this change in U.S. law does not limit the terms of patents
that were filed prior to 1995, the courts have recently taken steps to
mitigate the "submarine" patent problem for this older class of pat-

ents and patent applications. In two recent decisions, the Federal Circuit has held that excessive delay in the prosecution of a patent appli-

cation is inconsistent with the exercise of patent rights. ' In such cases
of "prosecution laches," the Patent Office has authority to reject the
patent application' and, if a patent does issue, the courts may refuse
148 The Federal Circuit has recently embraced a legal doctrine of "laches" which can invalidate a patent if the inventor delayed the issuance of the patent for too long a period of time. See
id at 1364-68. This doctrine helps to maintain a correlation between patent priority date and patent expiration date, although it is more administratively complex than a simple rule that calculates the patent expiration date based on the priority date (in other words, the rule now used by
nearly every country in the world).
149 See 35 USC § 154(a)(2).The change was necessary to conform U.S. law to Article 33 of
the TRIPS Agreement. which requires the United States and other signatories to provide "the
term of [patent] protection [that] shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years
counted from the filing date." Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (Apr 15,1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 81.96 (1994).
15( See, for example, Martin J. Adelman, Patent Law Perspectives § 2.3 at 2-217 (Matthew
Bender 2d ed 2003) (noting that "in reality the United States has a modified first-to-file system"
because the statutory bars in 35 USC § 102(b) establish "a basic and large class of prior art ...
that cannot be challenged by the inventor based on his date of invention"): Edward G. Fiorito,
Highlights of Selected Recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform. I
Tex Intel Prop J 11, 16 (1992) (noting the sense in industry that "there is already a de facto firstto-file system in place" in the United States since "less than one percent of applications get into
interference, and most of the time the senior party [the first to file] wins").
15 See Symbol Technologies, 277 F3d at 1364-65 (stating that laches may be applied to bar
enforcement of a patent issued after unreasonable delay in prosecution, even if the applicant
complied with relevant rules and statutes): In re Bogese. 303 F3d 1362 (Fed Cir 2002) (holding
that the patent office may rely on the doctrine of laches to deny a patent).
152 See Bogese. 303 F3d at 1367-68 (stating that the Patent Office "may impose reasonable
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to enforce it.' 3 While the legal authority for these decisions has been
questioned, ' the policy behind the decisions is sound, for these decisions improve the correlation between patent priority and patent
expiration.
In most major foreign patent systems, including the European
and Japanese systems, a doctrine of prosecution laches or any similar
corrective measure is unnecessary because the law in those jurisdictions has long been that patents expire a fixed number of years after
the application filing date and the filing date controls patent priority.'
Thus, the inventor recognized as having priority to patent (the winner
of the patent race) is also always the inventor seeking the patent
rights that will expire soonest. Those patent systems are therefore better able to function as efficient Demsetzian auctions. This analysis
does not necessarily suggest that a first-to-file priority system is better
than a first-to-invent system. But it does suggest that, if a first-toinvent priority is to be kept, the expiration date of a patent should be
correlated to the priority date claimed-that is, to the date of invention if the date of invention establishes the priority to patent.
B.

How Long?: Patent Term Length

Viewing patent races as Demsetzian auctions also provides a crucial insight into the much-debated topic of the optimal patent term.
Under this view, the social benefit of a patent race is that the race
minimizes the time until patent expiration. A natural question to ask
then is: What patent term will help to minimize the time of patent expiration? The key insight here is to see that a longer patent term may
in some instances make the patent expire sooner because the invention will be made earlier.
Consider, for example, the hypothetical invention having the social benefits graphed in Figure 2 set forth in Part 1I of this Article. Let
us assume as before that this hypothetical invention costs $100 to develop fully and that the patentee can capture all of the social benefits
during the patent term and none thereafter. Let us further assume that
deadlines and requirements on parties that appear before it").
153 See Symbol Technologies. 277 F3d at 1364-65.
154 In both Symbol Technologies and Bogese, Judge Newman dissented on the ground that
the "prosecution laches" doctrine lacks statutory authority. See Symbol Technologies. 277 F3d at
1369 (Newman dissenting) (arguing that prosecution laches amounts to the "judicial creation of
a new ground on which to challenge patents that fully comply with the statutory requirements"):
Bogese, 303 F3d at 1370 (Newman dissenting) (arguing that "there is no basis on which to grant
authority to the patent examination agency to impose its own non-statutory time limits for examination purposes").
155 Merges and Duffy Patent Law and Policy at 57.363-64 (cited in note 21) (noting that in
almost every country other than the United States, a patent "applicant's novelty is measured as
of the filing date" and thus the "first to file wins the patent").
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the patent term is one year and then ask: When will the patent expire?
The answer is clearly well after any year shown on the chart. Because
the patentee will obtain royalties for only one year, the patentee will
not have a sufficient incentive to create the invention until the royalties in a single year equal the entire cost of the innovation. In fact, using an assumption of 5 percent annual growth in royalties, the time of
patenting will be delayed until 2056, with patent expiration not occurring until 2057. Clearly, this is not a socially optimal result because, if
the patent term had been longer, the invention would have been
placed into the public domain decades earlier and society would have
been capturing the social benefits of the innovation free of any monopoly right during that time.
Three points are worth noting here. First, if the patent system is
considered an auction in time for the rights to develop an innovation,
then the limitations on patent term are properly viewed as controlling
the size of the "bid" that can be made at any given time. For example,
if we again refer to the hypothetical shown in Figure 2, setting the patent term equal to one year means that, in 2010, society is offering a
$10 reward for the creation of the invention. If, as assumed, $100 is
needed to develop the invention, no firm will leap at that opportunity.
Similarly, if the patent term is increased to about fourteen years, then
the bid set in 2010 for this particular invention is approximately $100,
and firms should be just willing to invent if duplication is not a threat.
If the term is twenty years, then the bid set for 2010 is $126, and some
firm should have accepted a bid made at an earlier time. Society therefore has an interest in ensuring that the bid established by the patent
term is sufficiently large that invention can occur near the optimal
time for invention. If society sets the reward too high (that is, sets the
patent length too long), the prospect features of the patent system decrease the inefficiencies associated with the overly long term and thus
make the system somewhat insensitive to excessive patent terms.
Second, recognizing that longer patent terms can lead to earlier
patent expiration also sheds new light on a limitation in previous
analyses of the optimal patent term. The classic analysis of patent term
length is found in William Nordhaus's work, which views the problem
of setting the optimal patent term in terms of achieving a balance between the incentives necessary to encourage innovation and the inefficiencies associated with longer-lasting exclusive rights:
As the [patent] life is increased, two opposite forces affect the
level of economic welfare. First, a longer life increases invention
and thus gives on balance a larger amount of output for a given
level of inputs. This is a positive effect. Second, a longer life
means that the monopoly on information lasts longer and thus
there are more losses from inefficiencies associated with monop-
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oly. The optimal life of a patent is that point at which the two

forces balance at the margin. '*
Other researchers have taken similar approaches, with the general assumption being that increases in patent term "defer[]" or "postpone[]" the time at which monopoly distortions are eliminated and
society captures the full benefits of innovation. ' This view of the optimal patent term problem is, however, explicitly based on a "static"
approach to innovation:'*" Nordhaus's model assumes that all invest-

ments in research occur at a specific fixed time and that a longer patent term can induce an increase in the "size" of innovation but not affect the timing of the innovation. Increasing patent life under these assumptions always pushes the date of patent expiration later and
thereby extends monopoly power to a time in which production would

have occurred without the distortions of the inventor's exclusive right.
These assumptions, however, do not account for the observed reality
that firms can race in time; they can choose to accelerate or to delay
their investments in research and development. Where such racing is
possible, increasing the patent term up to a certain minimum level will
accelerate rather than postpone the time at which the patent monopoly ends. Under fairly general assumptions, this level can be shown to
be a minimum optimal patent term.1
156 William D. Nordhaus. Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change 76 (MIT 1969). Nordhaus's work remains a standard citation for a theory of
optimal patent life. See, for example, Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 400
(MIT 1988) (citing Nordhaus for further discussion of optimal patent length). Nordhaus is not
alone in believing the issue of patent term length to be a tradeoff between the greater incentives
for invention and increased social cost of a longer monopoly. See C. Michael White. Why a
Seventeen Year Patent?, 38 J Pat Off Socy 839, 840 (1956) ("Ideally the legal life of a patent
should represent a balance between the additional incentive of another year and the social cost
of a longer monopoly."); Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights in cDNA Sequences: A New
Resident for the Public Domain,3 U Chi Roundtable 575,577 (1996) (describing the "basic social
choice" as "whether the incentives for the creation of these inventions and discoveries are large
enough to justify the restrictions on output that follow when rights over invention or discovery
are vested exclusively in the inventor and discoverer").
157 See, for example, EM. Scherer. Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric
Reinterpretation, 62 Am Econ Rev 422,424 (1972) ("To find the socially optimal patent life, one
must balance the marginal deferrals of [the deadweight loss triangle] and the (rising) RD costs
against the increasing amount of cost reduction . . . stimulated by longer patent lives.');
McFetridge and Rafiquzzaman, 8 Rsrch L & Econ at 95 (cited in note 80) ("An increase in the
patent term does increase the amount of cost reduction forthcoming and thus the areas of [the
consumer surplus rectangle] and [the deadweight loss triangle]. It also postpones the date at
which both are realized as surplus."); Lawrence M. DeBrock. Market Structure, Innovation, and
Optimal Patent Life. 28 J L & Econ 223.223 (1985) ("Extension of the duration of protection will
increase incentives for private resource allocation toward technical advance. Unfortunately, extension of patent protection by definition brings with it the social inefficiencies recognized in a
monopolistic market.").
158 Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare at 18 (cited in note 156).
159 For a complete discussion, see Duffy, Minimum Optimal Patent Term (cited in note 124).
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Finally, a third important point about patent term is that, if the
patent term is less than the minimum optimal term, then innovation is
guaranteed to occur inefficiently late."'" This means that the effect
identified by Barzel of inefficiently accelerated innovation cannot occur in a patent system with term lengths at or below this minimum
even if the patentee succeeds in capturing the full social benefit of an
invention during the patent term. Because the patent terms traditionally allowed under Anglo-American law (between fourteen and
twenty years) are quite close to this minimum threshold, '"' the effect
identified by Barzel is probably not likely to be a serious problem in a
real-world patent system. The major benefit of a prospect patent is
thus likely to lie not in preventing the overly early dedication of resources to innovation, but in preventing wasteful duplication of efforts.
C.

How Early?: No Need to Escape Rivalry

Because the prospect theory was formulated as a response to
Barzel's common pool problem, it stressed the early grant of broad
patents. No limits on how early the grant should occur were acknowledged. In his response to McFetridge and Smith, Kitch made clear that
his theory seeks to push patenting back to "the early stages of innovation"-a point early enough to avoid rent dissipation.' 2 So too Grady
and Alexander have sought to push patenting back to a time when a
"few [prospectors] are inherently swifter than most" so that "[r]ents
are preserved."' ' But to push patenting ever earlier in the hope of preserving rents is to chase a phantom. There has been no satisfactory
demonstration that rivalrous rent dissipation can be avoided where
the right to invent remains a common right, and the evidence shows
quite the contrary.'
If patent races are seen as Demsetzian auctions, the press for earlier patenting eases. The goal of the patent law is then to push patenting back to a time not before competitive pressures are felt, but before
significant duplication of effort occurs. (As previously mentioned, the
problem of excessive acceleration is a minor concern.) While competition among even a few rivals may be sufficient to dissipate all rents as61 Below this threshold, increasing the patent term would produce earlier innovation and
earlier patent termination, so an increase in the patent term would make society better off.
161 For realistic interest and economic growth rates (interest rates between 5 percent and 10
percent and growth rates between 2 percent and 5 percent), the threshold minimum ranges from
roughly thirteen years to thirty years. See Duffy. Minimum Optimal Patent Term at 12 (cited in
note 124).
162 Kitch, 23 J L & Econ at 206 (cited in note 74).
163 Grady and Alexander. 78 Va L Rev at 317 (cited in note 1).
164 See Part II.A.
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sociated with a patent, it may not produce much wasteful duplication
if the probability of success for each research approach is low. Indeed,
some evidence suggests that, in researching difficult technical problems, the costs of possible duplication are so low that, even where coordination of efforts is possible, it is not worth the bother.'h In such
circumstances, there is no need to push patenting earlier although rivalry may still be intense.
Moreover, while allowing inventors to patent in the early stages
of R&D efforts tends to create greater efficiency by trading duplication for acceleration, other factors begin to counterbalance this effect
as patenting is pushed earlier and earlier. The first, and most obvious,
of these offsetting factors is the steep rise in administrative costs because of the difficulties in defining and enforcing rights to an embryonic invention.
Another effect limiting the benefit of very early patenting is that,
in the early stages of research, firms may communicate which research
avenues they are pursuing. Kitch assumed the opposite. He argued
that secrecy would be a particularly acute problem in technological research and that it would exacerbate the common pool problem identified by Barzel: "[U]nlike fisheries, public roads, and the other types of
goods usually considered, technological information can be used without signaling that fact to another."'" While "[f]ishing boats can be detected, and one who is considering entry can take into account the
magnitude of his competitor's activities," this is not so in the area of
technological innovation, Kitch claimed, because "it is possible for a
firm working in secrecy to enter upon a 'prospect,' investigate it extensively, and depart without a trace."' 7 Yet a firm may have difficulty investigating a technological frontier in complete secrecy. Most obviously, the firm will have to enter a rarified labor market-the market
for PhDs and other highly educated professionals in that particular
field. Competition for qualified workers will itself convey information
to other firms about the technological prospects being investigated by
the firm.
Moreover, even if a firm could investigate technological prospects
in secrecy, disclosure may be in the firm's best interest in the early
stages of research, because the disclosure may deter entry by competi165 For example. Western Union underwrote research on telephony by at least two separate
researchers. Thomas Edison and Elisha Gray, without requiring coordination of efforts. See Josephson, Edison at 139-40 (cited in note 82). Another Western Union researcher. G.W. Phelps.
was also assigned to investigate the technology, but he may have directed Gray's work. ld at 80,
138-39. Edison does not appear to have collaborated with the Gray/Phelps team, so Western Union was funding at least two independent lines of research without demanding that the researchers collaborate or coordinate their efforts.
166 Kitch. 20 J L & Econ at 276 (cited in note 2).
167 Id.
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tors more than it attracts them. The models set forth in Part II assumed that the players would not communicate with each other. This
assumption is justified if the private costs of communication outweigh
the private benefits, but the reverse is probably true during the early
stages of research.
Two effects must be considered. By communicating the research
projects that it is pursuing, a firm may signal to others that it has information (possibly from prior research projects) that the particular
project is promising, and this would attract competitors. But identifying research projects also tends to discourage other firms from engaging in similar projects because, if two firms of similar competence
choose the same project, then each firm's expected return decreases
by one-half."
In the very early stages of research, the second effect may dominate: If a firm has not yet done much work investigating the prospect,
other firms may not interpret the selection of the project as indicating
some special information about the project's potential. Also, in the
early stages of research, there may be many possible avenues of research with similar (low) probabilities of success. A firm could then
easily avoid the avenues chosen by competitors in favor of research
projects not yet investigated.
Even in later stages of research, prospective inventors may have
incentives to communicate at least the area in which they are working,
if such a disclosure would not disclose information useful to competing inventors. For example, in the race to invent a practical incandescent light, although prospective inventors "were not aware of the detailed progress of their rivals,... [they] each knew that others were entered in the competition."" And, when Thomas Edison decided that
he too would enter the race to invent, he disclosed his intention in a
newspaper interview, declaring "I have let the other inventors get the
start of me in this matter, somewhat,.., but I believe I can catch up to
them now."' '7..Such disclosures allow other firms considering entry into
a field to take into account the efforts of others.
In sum, awarding patents too early may insignificantly reduce duplicative efforts while increasing administrative costs for defining and
enforcing the right. The timing should be based on the need to avoid

168 For example, consider a game where players can choose a number between 1 and 100,
with the winning number chosen randomly and the prize divided among winners if more than
one player chooses the winning number. If the first player chooses 66 and discloses this choice to
the other players, then the expected value of choosing 66 for the next player is one-half the expected value of the other numbers.
169 Paul W. Keating, Lamps for a Brighter America 9 (McGraw-Hill 1954).
170 Arthur A. Bright, Jr., The Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological Change and Economic
Development from 1800 to 1947 58 (Macmillan 1949).
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duplication, not on a quixotic hope of limiting rivalry to preserve
rents.
D. How Broad?: The Complexities of Patent Scope
One recommendation of the prospect theory is that patents
should be broad as well as early. The underlying theory for granting
broad patents was similar to the prospect theory's rationale for granting patents early: The goal of granting patents was to try to eliminate
the common pool problem and thereby to preserve rents by placing an
entire field under the direction of one property owner. Broader was
better simply because more property was placed under one party's
control. Under the view advanced by this Article, the need for very
broad patents largely vanishes.
Under the view expressed here, a patent should be defined
broadly enough so that the patentee can capture the value of further
investments to develop the technology, but the theory provides no
reason to prefer a larger scope of property rights. For example, consider the first inventor to produce a laser. Should that inventor obtain
exclusive rights to just that specific laser, to a more general class of lasers (for example, lasers that use a gas rather than a solid as a lasing
medium), or to all lasers of any sort? The prospect theory would suggest that it should be the last. For Kitch the key question was whether
the property rights could be adequately defined. If they could, property rights should issue. Here, since the property right could be accurately delimited (for example, the patent could cover any device capable of producing coherent light), the theory would support granting
the patent because then the rents associated with the development of
all lasers could be preserved. '7
If, however, the limitations on patent term are already preserving
social rents (private rents are assumed to be dissipated in the competition to obtain the patent), then the preference for very broad patent
rights is not so simple. A very narrow definition of patent rights-for
example, covering only that particular laser-can be rejected because
such narrowly defined rights will not allow the inventor to capture the
benefits of investments in developing the laser. In other words, the investments to develop the laser will have enormous spillover effects
because of the narrow definition of the patentee's property rights. The
171 See Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 288-89 (cited in note 2) (arguing that, under the prospect
theory, basic scientific research is not patentable "because of the inability to fashion a meaningful property right around an explanation"); Kitch, 23 J L & Econ at 207 n 5 (cited in note 74)
(distinguishing a Barzelian auction system, which grants property rights prior to any expenditure
of resources in developing the technology, from a prospect patent system on the grounds that a
prospect patent system requires the revelation of "the information necessary to define the prospect right").
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choice between a particular class of lasers and all lasers is more difficult. The issue should turn on whether the broader rights are necessary to protect the investments that have been made in inventing, and
that will be made in developing, the patentee's particular laser. If the
patent has that scope, then broadening the patent further is unnecessary.
There is one other very important implication of the Demsetzian
auction approach: The patent system may be much more insensitive to
the scope of patents than has previously been recognized -or, at least,
insensitive once the patent scope exceeds a certain threshold. One
sentiment is that the scope of a patent should be "tailored" to reflect
the inventor's contribution. The intuition here is that an inventor
making a small contribution should not be over-rewarded with a
broad patent right. But the competition to capture patents, coupled
with the patent system's ability to grant patents long before the flow
of royalties begins, may eliminate the possibility for over-reward. Patent racing gives the patent system a certain self-adjusting quality. If
too broad of a patent (in other words, too great of a reward) is held
out for an innovation that is relatively inexpensive to invent, competition for the patent can be expected to push the time of patenting back
well before the time when the stream of royalties will commence. The
patentee will receive no windfall and, if few resources are actually expended in capturing the patent, then the overly large scope creates little inefficiency; it means only that firms will patent earlier and thereby
bid away years of royalties that, were it not for the broad patent scope,
would be necessary to create an appropriately sized reward to cover
the costs of creating the invention.
This self-correcting mechanism can function, however, only if decisions about patent scope are predictable.Thus, rather than seeking to
tailor the scope of each patent so that the scope in each particular case
provides an optimal reward (an issue on which there is little consensus), the Patent Office and the courts might better turn their attention
to developing predictable rules that give a certain well-defined scope
to every patent and that help competitors in patent races better predict the scope of patent rights that they can expect to obtain. That goal
is not only more modest, but also more realistic.
172 See Merges and Nelson, 90 Colum L Rev at 916 (cited in note 16) (concluding that
"scope doctrines can be used to approximate the 'tailoring' function proposed
by economists
who model optimal patent length"): R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administralion and the Failureof Festo, 151 U Pa L Rev 159, 196 (2002) (identifying "patent scope as a primary driver" in establishing a "proportional reward" for the patentee's invention). Even Kitch
seemed to assume that there was a particular patent scope dictated by the reward theory. See
Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 267 (cited in note 2) (claiming that the patent system affords patent
claims "a scope that reaches well beyond what the reward function would require").
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Encouraging Rivalry in Improvement: Compulsory Licensing of
Pioneer Patents

The discussion in Part III showed the inconsistency between the
prospect theory and the basic rule of patent law that the right to seek
patentable improvements remains a common right even within the
claims of an existing patent. In fact, the patent laws of most nations affirmatively encourage improvers to continue prospecting within existing patent claims. The encouragement is provided by two doctrines.
First, the experimental use doctrine allows researchers to experiment
with a patented technology without obtaining the permission of the
patent holder. Second, once another inventor has found and patented
an improvement, many countries include compulsory licensing provisions that compel pioneer patentees to grant a license to the im'
prover.' Though the U.S. law on experimental use has varied, compulsory licensing of improvers has never been a part of U.S. law. As
Kitch noted, the effect of compulsory licensing is that "[t]hird parties
can search for ways to increase the value of the patent and when they
find it force the owner to license the patent at the regulated rate......
Kitch criticized compulsory licensing provisions as "destroy[ing] the
prospect function......
While it is true that compulsory licensing provisions facilitate uncoordinated searches by third parties, such searches are already encouraged by permitting third parties to experiment with patented
technologies and to obtain blocking patents within the claims of existing patents. Kitch conspicuously failed to consider these features of
patent law, even though they cause the same type of damage to the
prospect function as compulsory licensing.' For patent systems with
such features, compulsory licensing cannot be criticized merely because it would encourage third parties to search for improvements to
issued patents.
Compulsory licensing proposals can be evaluated only with an
understanding of why the patent system allows the race for patentable
improvements to continue even within the claims of issued patents.
173 See Robert P.Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations.84 Cal L Rev 1293. 1316 n 61 (1996) (citing the compulsory licensing laws in foreign jurisdictions).
174 See note 68.
175 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 287 (cited in note 2). For purposes of this Article, compulsory licensing proposals will refer to proposals that force licenses only in a case of blocking patents.
176 Id.
177 See Lemley, 75 Tex L Rev at 1048-53 (cited in note 14) (noting the inconsistency between the allowance of blocking patents and the prospect theory); Eisenberg, 56 U Chi L Rev at
1044 (cited in note 68) (noting that "an experimental use exemption [to infringement] arguably
undermines the prospect function" because it permits "unauthorized (and uncoordinated) research" by inventors seeking to improve the prospect patent).
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That general feature of the patent law is best explained by the view
presented here-that the patent system does not try to prevent rivalry
but only to force it toward accelerated patenting. Permitting uncoordinated searches for innovations to continue within the claims of an
earlier patent then makes sense. Competition for patentable improvements to existing patents is little different from the competition
for the initial patent. In particular, the improvement patent comes
with its own twenty-year lifetime, which extends the effective lifetime
of exclusive rights to some portion of the technology covered by the
pioneering patent. Thus, the same social interest in encouraging earlier
patenting (and thus earlier patent expiration) is implicated by the improvement patent as by the pioneering patent. The law therefore allows at least some degree of competition for improvement patents.
As discussed in Part III, the pioneering firm will have some advantages in this competition for improvements, and these advantages
will give the pioneer some power to coordinate research into patentable improvement. The pioneer's advantage arises in part because
of the steep transaction costs of licensing blocking patents. Compulsory licensing may decrease the transaction costs of blocking patents
and thereby somewhat decrease the pioneer's power to coordinate research. Compulsory licensing would not, however, eliminate transaction costs. Most obviously, both sides would bear legal costs associated
with the compulsory licensing system. Because transaction costs continue to exist, the pioneering firm still has a greater incentive to make
improvements than all other firms, and this is true without regard to
the level of royalties set in the compulsory licensing proceeding. Thus,
even though the pioneer's control over subsequent innovation-which
is already significantly limited-would be further diminished by compulsory licensing, it would not be eliminated. Compulsory licensing
does not effect a categorical change, and it cannot be rejected simply
because it is inconsistent with the prospect theory.7

F.

The Standard for Invention
Under black letter law, a patentable discovery must not only be
new and useful but also meet some threshold standard of inventiveness. Since the novelty requirement is uncontroversial, and utility is
found upon a quite trivial showing, the requirement of inventiveness is
considered the "final gatekeeper of the patent system"' 79 and "the ul178 Other reasons may compel rejection of compulsory licensing proposals. If, for example,
compulsory licensing royalties are set too low, the value of improvement patents may be high
enough to trigger excessive duplication.
179 Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 644 (cited in note 21) (discussing the importance of the nonobviousness doctrine).
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timate condition of patentability.""' Traditionally, this requirement
("nonobviousness" or "inventive step" as it is now called in, respectively, the American and European patent systems) has been justified
as a corollary to the "reward theory" of patent law: New and useful
creations that are also relatively obvious do not deserve the reward of
a patent because the social benefits of the invention are outweighed
by the social costs of the patent monopoly.8'
Though Kitch claimed that his prospect theory was proposed only
as a supplement to the reward theory," his discussion of the inventive
standard demonstrates how far his theory departs from the traditional
reward theory. Kitch claimed that "the arguments for a property right
in technological information all depend on the assumption that investment in the search for ways to enhance the value of the information is needed."".. Ultimately, he endorsed a "substantial novelty" test
for invention because, he believed, any substantially new information
may need some inquiry into ways to enhance its value. Such a view
justifies patent protection based solely on post-patent effects; it does
not consider the pre-patent incentives to invent that may be created
by the patent as a reward.
Grady and Alexander have taken Kitch's views on patentability
logical conclusion. Because the prospect theory justifies pattheir
to
ents as a necessary means of coordinating and controlling searches for
further enhancements, the theory leads to a sort of reverse Occam's
Razor-"a simple and elegant solution" incapable of improvement
should receive no patent protection.' 4 That conclusion is bizarre, and it
highlights the prospect theory's inability to replace the reward theory
as the central justification for the patent system. For if holding out a
patent reward limited in both time and scope encourages a simple and
elegant solution that would otherwise not be found, society is better
off providing the reward in exchange for the solution. Denying patents
to such innovations will discourage research into the simple and ele1( John F. Witherspoon, ed, Nonobviousness- The Ultimate Condition of Patentability:Papers Compiled in Commemoration of the Silver Anniversary of 35 USC 103 (Bureau of National
Affairs 1980).
181 The best historical account of the development of the nonobviousness doctrine remains
Kitch's 1966 article, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standardfor Patents, 1966 S Ct Rev 293. In
his prospect theory article, Kitch recanted some of his conclusions from this article. See Kitch, 20
J L & Econ at 282 (cited in note 2) ("[Mly 1966 effort to derive a manageable standard from the
economic literature was a failure.
182 Kitch, 20 J L & Econ at 266-67 (cited in note 2) ("The reward theory is not questioned
on its own terms. Rather, it is argued that the reward theory offers an incomplete view of the
functions of the patent system.").
183 Id at 283 (emphasis added).
184 Grady and Alexander, 78 Va L Rev at 325 (cited in note 1) (noting that conversely, "a
complicated or imperfect solution fares much better"). See also id ("Just as philosophers have
applied 'Occam's Razor' to their analytical problems, so have patent courts applied its reverse.").
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gant; there is no plausible justification that society should favor complex and dense technical solutions.
Under the view presented in this Article, providing incentives to
create nonobvious knowledge-knowledge that would not be created
without such incentives-still provides the basic justification for the
patent system. The so-called prospect features of the patent systemespecially the preference for early patenting of technical discoverieshave a subservient function: They channel the inevitable competition
for patent rewards into an activity, accelerated patenting, that is likely
to have high positive externalities because earlier patent term expirations mean earlier transfers of property to the public domain. But the
innovation for which society is conferring such a reward must be of
sufficient importance that significant positive externalities do exist.
Otherwise society will be expending resources to define and enforce
patent rights without realizing any gain.
The value of the nonobviousness requirement can be seen most
directly by considering the effects if the law did enforce patent rights
on new but obvious ideas. By "obvious," I mean capable of being created with little or no effort by anyone who has the standardlevel of skill

in the art. In other words, the economic cost of producing the idea
(that is, the underlying information) is very close to zero. Though trivial to produce, the idea may still have a large economic value if one
could obtain a monopoly on it. For example, consider the idea of creating a streamlined "one-click" method for internet purchasing.' This
idea is very likely obvious,"' but nonetheless monopoly rights to the
idea gained substantial economic value during the late 1990s due to
the rise of internet commerce. ' For simplicity, let us assume that this
idea is trivial to produce and has substantial economic value beginning around 1996 or so. If the patent system were to enforce patent
rights on such an idea and the rivalry to obtain the rights were to func185 See US Patent No 5,960,411 (Sept 28, 1999) (patent assigned to Amazon.com on a oneclick internet ordering system).
186 See Amazon.com, Inc v Barnesandnoble.com, Inc, 239 F3d 1343, 1363 (Fed Cir 2001)
(vacating a preliminary injunction on the defendant's use of a one-click ordering system because
the defendant succeeded in raising a "substantial question of [the patent's] invalidity" on
grounds of obviousness). Amazon.com settled its infringement action before the question of patent invalidity could be litigated to a conclusion. See Online Booksellers End Dispute, NY Times
C4 (Mar 8,2002). Prior to the Federal Circuit decision cited above, the Amazon.com patent had
already gained infamy in the popular press. See, for example, James Gleick, Patently Absurd. NY
Times Mag 44 (Mar 12, 2000) (claiming that "[w]hen 21st-century historians look back at the
breakdown of the United States patent system, they will see a turning point in the case of Jeff
Bezos and Amazon.com and their special invention: 'The patented One Click® feature,' as Bezos
calls it").
187 See Amazon.com, Inc v Barnesandnoble.com, Inc, 73 F Supp 2d 1228, 1237 (WD Wash
1999) (finding that Amazon.com's one-click patent has "significant commercial value"). We can
also be confident that monopoly rights on a one-click system have substantial economic value
because parties spent significant resources and several years litigating the matter.
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tion well, then the theory presented here suggests that competition
would push patenting back to a time long before 1996. Indeed, if rivalry functions well, then patenting should be pushed back so far that
the patent would expire just shortly after 1996-in other words, it
would expire just shortly after it begins to have any economic effect
on the market. The royalties realized by the patentee would be just
enough to cover the administrative and legal costs of obtaining the
patent. The harm to society would not be great; the market would not
have to endure twenty years of monopoly distortion. But there would
be some harm. Society would bear the administrative costs of defining
and enforcing the patent but would reap no benefit because persons
of ordinary skill in the art would have generated this obvious streamlining of internet check-out systems even without the incentive of patent protection.
The actual history of the one-click example also illustrates another important point: The obviousness doctrine may be most important where the temporal rivalry for patents has not functioned well
due to an unexpected development. For example, assume that the
dramatic rise of internet commerce in the late 1990s was an unexpected development in the sense that it could not have been accurately forecast. In that case, the temporal racing of the sort assumed in
this Article could not have occurred. Rather, when the unexpected development occurred, only then would individuals in the nascent industry have realized the value of streamlined internet commerce systems
or, for that matter, thousands of other obvious ideas relating to internet commerce. To the extent that the patent system is willing to enforce patents on such new but obvious ideas, then the unexpected development could trigger a flood of patent applications trying to secure
monopoly rights to the new but obvious ideas that have suddenly
come to have evident economic value. If the nonobviousness requirement is not enforced, then society could pay a particularly heavy price.
Patent racing will not be able to drive the time of patenting earlier,
and the market might very well have to endure approximately two
decades of monopoly distortions due to patents on ideas that would
have been generated without patent incentives.
Finally, the nonobviousness doctrine serves one more important
function: It regulates a prospect patent holder's power to control further development of the property. As explained in Part III, the holders
of pioneering patents have complete control over investments in nonpatentable improvements but only limited control over investments in
patentable advances. A weak nonobviousness doctrine diminishes a
pioneer patentee's control over the field covered by its patent because
it makes more mundane advances patentable. Thus, a weak nonobviousness doctrine can actually defeat the purpose of early patent grants
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because the grant of the patent does not insulate the patentee from
much competitive pressure and may not discourage much duplicative
effort.
G. A Cautionary Tale: From Oakland to Eldred
The Demsetzian auction analogy has one final policy implication:
Patent rights should be neither contracted nor expanded retroactively-any legislated change in the dimensions of patent rights should
apply only to inventions not yet completed. Such retroactive changes
are problematic not because they result in transfers of wealth either
from the patentee to the public (for contractions) or vice versa (for
expansions). Mere transfers of wealth do not necessarily create any
inefficiency. But retroactive changes have an efficiency cost. Contractions make the property rights less certain and therefore diminish the
incentives to achieve a patentable innovation and to develop that innovation after patenting. Expansions of rights not only transfer wealth
from consumers to the patentee but also extend the deadweight loss
associated with the patent into later time periods. Moreover, retroactive changes do not just happen randomly. They happen because parties have skillfully lobbied policymaking institutions to make the
changes and, of course, lobbying for such changes triggers lobbying
against change. The resources spent lobbying for and against retroactive change could be spent in productive activity.
Here the Demsetzian auction analogy is particularly instructive.
Retroactive patent extensions and contractions are comparable to
post hoc renegotiations of the auction terms under a Demsetzian system. If such renegotiations are permitted, then rents associated with
the exclusive right will, in part and perhaps in large part, be dissipated
by expenditures on political lobbying. As Oliver Williamson has noted
in his classic study of the auction for the Oakland, California cable
franchise, post hoc renegotiations of a franchise auction make a Demsetzian auction begin to exhibit some of the undesirable features of
administrative regulation, with interest groups vying to increase or decrease the prices charged by the franchisee.' Indeed, in Williamson's
study of the Oakland cable franchise, post hoc renegotiations ultimately resulted in franchise terms that little resembled the original
deal.'" Such post hoc renegotiations have been the Achilles' heel of
188 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutionsof Capitalism:Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting352-64 (Free Press 1985).
189 Id at 359 (detailing the extensive revisions to the franchise terms approved by the Oakland City Council after the awarding of the franchise). Another good example is the history of
the Charles River Bridge franchise that was granted in 1785 in Boston. See Charles River Bridge
v Warren Bridge, 36 US 420 (1837) (discussing the ability of the city to authorize construction of
nearby bridges). Though grants of exclusive rights in that era were not based on any formal auc-
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Demsetzian auctions, which are elegant in theory but difficult to implement in practice.
In the main, the patent system has been able to avoid the problem of post hoc renegotiations of the patent grant. Although
nineteenth-century patent law did have a general administrative

mechanism for extending patent terms (and Congress was also more
willing to grant special extensions),' ' the patent terms today are rela-

tively well defined, with retroactive extensions of rights being relatively rare.' So too contractions of patent rights have been rare. Indeed, in at least some instances where Congress has contracted patent
rights, it has simultaneously expanded rights in other dimensions. For
example, in the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress restricted drug manu-

facturers' rights to enjoin the use of their patented inventions where
the use is reasonably related to the development and submission of information required by federal laws regulating the drug industry. "2
However, the Act simultaneously granted drug manufacturers patentterm extensions in cases where the regulatory testing and approval
process had delayed the marketing of their patented products. "' The

statute thus had a rough justice to it: It protected both patentees and
the public from the distortions caused by regulatory delay.'9 Yet this
tion method, still the original charters did spell out specific terms, including the duration of the
franchise and limitations on the tolls that the franchisee would be allowed to charge the public.
See id at 536 (noting that the franchise for the Charles River Bridge authorized certain tolls and
limited the franchise grant to forty years). See also Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge, 24
Mass 344, 379 (1829) (quoting the original franchise, which limited both the franchise term and
the tolls that could be charged). These terms were supposedly the conditions under which the
franchisee accepted the exclusive rights but, in practice, the original terms were not fixed in
stone. In the case of the Charles River Bridge, for example, the original term of forty years was
extended to seventy years in 1792, seven years after the original grant. See Charles River Bridge,
36 US at 426 ("In 1792, the charter was extended to seventy years from the opening of the
bridge."). Thirty-six years later, the state authorized another bridge to be built less than one hundred yards from the Charles River Bridge, and that bridge effectively ended the Charles River
Bridge franchise by dramatically curtailing its profitability.
190 See, for example, Bloomer v McQuewan, 55 US 539 (1852) (noting multiple extensions
of a patent on planing machines through both administrative renewal of the patent and special
legislation by Congress).
191 One recent example is contained in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub L No
103-465, 108 Stat 4809,4984 (1994), which changed the general U.S. patent term from seventeen
years, measured from the date of patent issuance, to twenty years, measured from the date on
which the patent application was filed. See 35 USC § 154(a)(2). The statute, however, gave the
benefit of the twenty-year patent term to all existing patents where the new rule would result in
a longer patent term. As a result, many patents expired later than they would have under the
originally granted term.
192 See The Drug, Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub L No 98-417,98
Stat 1585 (1984), codified in part at 35 USC §§ 156, 271(e) (2000) (commonly known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act). The restrictions on patentees' rights are found in 35 USC § 271 (e).
193 See 35 USC § 156 (extending patent length if a product is subject to a regulatory review
period before commercial marketing).
194 The patentee was compensated for the effective loss of its monopoly term caused by
regulatory delay, and the public was assured that, when a patent term did expire, the regulatory
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sort of statute, which makes relatively minor retroactive changes and
includes compensating expansions and contractions of patent rights,
presents a danger to the integrity of the patent system. The possibility
of change through renegotiation attracts expenditures on lobbying
that destabilize the certainty, and the efficiency, of the overall auction
system.
To date, the patent system has been remarkably resistant to the
possibility of post hoc renegotiations. This is perhaps because the bargain set by the patent system is simpler than the franchise auction
method envisioned by Demsetz. The Demsetzian system tries to regulate the prices charged by the franchisee and the quality of service
provided. The complexity of franchise constraints may create numerous opportunities for seemingly minor ad hoc adjustments that cumulatively undermine the basic bargain supposedly struck when the franchise was awarded. The patent system, by contrast, imposes a much
simpler constraint. It limits the duration of the franchise term but
leaves patentees free to determine what price the market will bear.
This simplicity may make the constraint more difficult to circumvent.
Nevertheless, the patent system's resistance to renegotiation may
be weakening. In recent years, specific companies, particularly in the
pharmaceutical industry, have mounted intense lobbying efforts for
retroactive extensions of particular patents.' And, in the recent decision Eldred v Ashcroft,'9 the Supreme Court removed any constitu-

tional argument against retroactive extensions of intellectual property
rights. 7 In this regard, the experience of franchise auctions should
serve as a cautionary tale: If renegotiations become prevalent-if term
extensions such as the copyright extension sustained in Eldred be-

approval process would not forestall competition since competitors could go through the regulatory process while the patent was still in force.
195 See, for example, Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights:
Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 237 (2001) (detailing ScheringPlough's twenty-million-dollar lobbying campaign to have Congress extend its existing patent on
the drug Claritin); Outside Influences: A Patently Clear Reversal on Drugs, National Journal's
CongressDaily (May 24, 2000) (discussing the lobbying campaign by Columbia University to
have one of its biotechnology patents legislatively extended); Andrew Pollack, Columbia Gets
Help from Alumnus on Patent Extension, NY Times § 1 at 37 (May 21,2000) (noting that Columbia alumnus Senator Judd Gregg was leading the effort to extend the Columbia patent).
196 537 US 186 (2003).
197 The case sustained the constitutionality of the retroactive copyright extension contained
in the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827 (1998), amending 17 USC §§ 302,304. See Eldred, 537 US at 193-94. The CTEA was widely perceived as having resulted from the lobbying efforts of various large copyright holders, especially the Disney
Corporation whose copyrights on Mickey Mouse would have expired but for the extension. See
Amy Harmon, The Supreme Court: The Context: A Corporate Victory, But One That Raises Public Consciousness, NY Times A24 (Jan 16,2003) ("In 1998, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act was passed with hardly any debate after heavy lobbying by the Walt Disney Company, whose Mickey Mouse movies were about to fall into the public domain.").

2004]

Rethinking the ProspectTheory of Patents

come common in the patent field-then the franchise auction system
collapses. It is in the long-term interests of both intellectual property
producers and society in general to ensure that such a fate does not
befall the patent system.
CONCLUSION

The great success of the prospect theory lies in its establishment
of a useful theoretical analogy between patents and real property
rights. Edmund Kitch was one of the first theorists to focus attention
on the timing and scope of patent grants, and his prospect theory provides the compelling insight that patents, like other property rights,
create incentives for their owners to manage further investment in developing and improving the property. As Kitch explained, this insight
accounts for an overarching feature of the patent system-the system's willingness to grant rights at a very early stage of development,
when much additional investment is still needed to develop the invention into a valuable form. The patent system need not delay the issuance of rights until a commercially viable product is ready for market;
it can instead rely on the incentives inherent in the patent property to
encourage the patent owner to finish the development.
Yet if the analogy between property and patents is the strength of
the prospect theory, it is the weakness too. Kitch proposed the prospect theory as a solution to the common pool problem that, as noted
by Barzel, can afflict innovation. The early grant of rights would put
an end to patent racing and therefore lead to more efficient development of the technology. But even with an early grant of rights, patent
racing remains a theoretical possibility-and, indeed, a reality. The
prospect theory did not provide a satisfying answer to the common
pool problem. On this point, the property analogy served only to highlight this weakness in the prospect theory, for the history of inefficient,
rent-dissipating "gold rushes" has been well documented. The property analogy failed in other respects too. It did not explain why the
right to innovate remains a common right even within a field already
subject to patent rights, and it did not explain why patent rights have
strict limits on their duration.
While Kitch drew inspiration from property rights theory, this Article draws an analogy between the patent system and natural monopoly regulation. The analogy is apt because intellectual property is a
special case of natural monopoly: The initial investment to create the
good is large, but the marginal cost of providing the good for additional uses is negligible. In such cases, economic theory recommends
that provision of the good by a single firm-that is, monopoly-is superior to provision by multiple firms, and in the regulation of both
natural monopoly and intellectual property, the law has followed this
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recommendation. In both areas, the central policy question then becomes how to constrain the behavior of the monopolist so as to
maximize social welfare.
The proposal made by Harold Demsetz in the context of natural
monopoly regulation was to harness competition to constrain the monopolist and to maximize consumer welfare. Demsetz's proposal describes the reality of the patent system. A patent race is not only a rivalry to invent first, but also a rivalry to have the patent expire soonest. The rivalry is accentuated by the patent system's willingness to
grant exclusive rights relatively early in technical development, for
that feature of the system ensures that patent rents are dissipated
primarily through the earlier termination of the rights.
This view accounts for features of the patent system left unexplained by the prospect theory. In particular, it explains why a policy
favoring the early grant of patent rights has value even if rivalry to obtain patents remains ubiquitous, and it explains why the system continues the competition for patents even within the claims of already issued patents. The approach also provides new insight into deciding the
optimal limits of patent term and patent scope, and into other major
issues in patent law.
The patent system can best be understood in reference to the
theories and policies undergirding property, competition, and natural
monopoly regulation. Kitch stressed the relationship between the first
two-in particular, the desirability of granting property rights to end
rivalry. The modest goal of this Article is to explain the interrelation of
the last two and, in particular, the desirability of accentuating rivalry
to constrain monopoly.

